Intermediation and Resale in Networks
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10171449 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mihai Manea (Stanford University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 126 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 1250-1301 |
| Publication date | 2018-01-29 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/697205 |
| OpenAlex | W2786081673 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 23 |
I study intermediation via sequential bilateral bargaining in markets with a network structure. A partition of the network into layers captures intermediation power. Competition governs trade within layers, and hold-ups generate intermediation rents in transactions between layers. Each trader’s intermediation power reflects the competition among intermediation chains as measured by the number of layers separating the trader from buyers. Trade does not maximize welfare or minimize intermediation. The interplay between competition and hold-ups determines the level of inefficiency. Eliminating middlemen or transferring intermediation costs downstream increases seller profits. Downstream and upstream competition respond oppositely to either horizontal or vertical integration
Bargaining power · Business · Competition (biology · Downstream (manufacturing · Economic rent · Economics · Industrial organization · Inefficiency · Intermediary · Intermediation · Market power · Microeconomics · Monopoly · Operations management · Telecommunications · Upstream (networking · Vertical Integration · Computer Science · Digital Platforms and Economics · Economic theories and models · Finance · Merger and Competition Analysis
| Citations per year | 0.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2014 - 2024 (11) |
| Highly cited | No |