Umut Dur
Biographic Data
| ID | 5867526 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Umut Dur |
| GIVEN NAMES | Umut |
| FAMILY NAME | Dur |
| SIGNATURE | DUR U |
| AFFILIATIONS | North Carolina State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0553-8382 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The attraction of magnet schools: Evidence from embedded lotteries in school assignment
Partitionable choice functions and stability
Sequential school choice with public and private schools
A characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem
This paper characterizes the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism for the school choice problem where schools may have multiple available seats to be assigned to students. We first define weaker forms of fairness, consistency, and resource monotonicity. We show that the TTC mechanism is the unique Pareto efficient and strategy-proof mechanism that satisfies these weaker forms of fairness, consistency and resource monotonicity. We also show that in …
Rawlsian Matching
Increasing the representation of a targeted type in a reserve system
Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets
The modified Boston mechanism
Two-Sided Matching via Balanced Exchange
We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchanges, in which export-import balances are required for longevity of programs. These exchanges use decentralized markets, making it difficult to achieve this goal. We introduce the two-sided top trading cycles, the unique mechanism that is balanced-efficient, worker-strategy-proof, acceptable, individually rational, and respecting priority bylaws…
Reserve Design: Unintended Consequences and the Demise of Boston’s Walk Zones
We show that in the presence of admissions reserves, the effect of the precedence order (i.e., the order in which different types of seats are filled) is comparable to the effect of adjusting reserve sizes. Either lowering the precedence of reserve seats at a school or increasing the school's reserve size weakly increases reserve-group assignment at that school. Using data from Boston Public Schools, we show that reserve and precedence adjustment…
Reserve Design: Unintended Consequences and the Demise of Boston’s Walk Zones
We show that in the presence of admissions reserves, the effect of the precedence order (i.e., the order in which different types of seats are filled) is comparable to the effect of adjusting reserve sizes. Either lowering the precedence of reserve seats at a school or increasing the school's reserve size weakly increases reserve-group assignment at that school. Using data from Boston Public Schools, we show that reserve and precedence adjustment…
Two-Sided Matching via Balanced Exchange
We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchanges, in which export-import balances are required for longevity of programs. These exchanges use decentralized markets, making it difficult to achieve this goal. We introduce the two-sided top trading cycles, the unique mechanism that is balanced-efficient, worker-strategy-proof, acceptable, individually rational, and respecting priority bylaws…
Reserve Design: Unintended Consequences and the Demise of Boston’s Walk Zones
We show that in the presence of admissions reserves, the effect of the precedence order (i.e., the order in which different types of seats are filled) is comparable to the effect of adjusting reserve sizes. Either lowering the precedence of reserve seats at a school or increasing the school's reserve size weakly increases reserve-group assignment at that school. Using data from Boston Public Schools, we show that reserve and precedence adjustment…
The modified Boston mechanism
Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets
Partitionable choice functions and stability
Sequential school choice with public and private schools
A characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem
This paper characterizes the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism for the school choice problem where schools may have multiple available seats to be assigned to students. We first define weaker forms of fairness, consistency, and resource monotonicity. We show that the TTC mechanism is the unique Pareto efficient and strategy-proof mechanism that satisfies these weaker forms of fairness, consistency and resource monotonicity. We also show that in …
Rawlsian Matching
Increasing the representation of a targeted type in a reserve system
The attraction of magnet schools: Evidence from embedded lotteries in school assignment
Economics (9 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (9 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Mathematical economics (6 works) · Mathematics (6 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (5 works) · Complexity and Algorithms in Graphs (4 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Artificial Intelligence (3 works) · Axiom (3 works)