Frédéric Koessler

Biographic Data

ID5867733
NAMEFrédéric Koessler
GIVEN NAMESFrédéric
FAMILY NAMEKoessler
SIGNATUREKOESSLER F
AFFILIATIONSParis School of Economics
ORCID0000-0001-7707-4217
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS26
TOTAL CITATIONS4
WORKS AS AUTHOR26
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2001
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2024
H-INDEX1

  • Interacting Mechanisms a Perspective on Generalized Principal-Agent Problems1

    Open AccessFrançoise Forges, Frédéric Koessler et al.PREPRINTSSRN Electronic Journal2024

  • Informed Information Design

    Frédéric Koessler, Vasiliki SkretaARTICLEJournal of Political Economy2023Cited by: 3References: 2

    We study informed persuasion, whereby a privately informed designer without ex ante commitment power chooses disclosure mechanisms to influence agents’ actions. We characterize the subset of Bayes-correlated equilibria yielding every designer type a payoff higher than what they could get from any disclosure mechanism with credible beliefs. This set of interim-optimal mechanisms is nonempty and tractable, and all its elements are perfect Bayesian …

  • Selective memory of a psychological agent

    Open AccessJeanne Hagenbach, Frédéric KoesslerARTICLEEuropean Economic Review2022

  • Cheap talk with coarse understanding

    Open AccessJeanne Hagenbach, Frédéric KoesslerARTICLEGames and Economic Behavior2020

  • Selling with evidence

    Open AccessFrédéric Koessler, Vasiliki SkretaARTICLETheoretical Economics2019

    We study the informed‐principal problem in a bilateral asymmetric information trading setting with interdependent values and quasi‐linear utilities. The informed seller proposes a mechanism and voluntarily certifies information about the good's characteristics. When the set of certifiable statements is sufficiently rich, we show that there is an ex ante profit‐maximizing selling procedure that is an equilibrium of the mechanism proposal game. In …

  • Evidence reading mechanisms

    Open AccessFrédéric Koessler, Eduardo Perez-RichetARTICLESocial Choice and Welfare2019

  • The Streisand effect

    Open AccessJeanne Hagenbach, Frédéric KoesslerARTICLEJournal of Economic Behavior &…2017

  • Truthtelling in Matching Markets

    Open AccessJeanne Hagenbach, Frédéric Koessler et al.ARTICLEScandinavian Journal of Economics2016

    We analyze a search and matching model with non‐transferable utility and asymmetric information. Randomly paired agents go through an evaluation phase, at the end of which they discover each other's types and choose to match or not. Before deciding to enter this phase, agents can communicate through cheap talk. We provide conditions for this communication to be informative, and we examine how it affects agents' welfare. We show that communication…

  • Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion

    Open AccessMehdi Ayouni, Frédéric KoesslerARTICLETheory and Decision2016

  • Informed seller with taste heterogeneity

    Open AccessFrédéric Koessler, Vasiliki SkretaARTICLEJournal of Economic Theory2016

  • Full disclosure in decentralized organizations

    Open AccessJeanne Hagenbach, Frédéric KoesslerARTICLEEconomics Letters2015

  • Sales Talk

    Open AccessFrédéric Koessler, Vasiliki SkretaARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2014

  • Extortion and political-risk insurance

    Open AccessFrédéric Koessler, Ariane Lambert‐Mogiliansky et al.ARTICLEJournal of Public Economics2014

  • Certifiable Pre-Play Communication

    Open AccessJeanne Hagenbach, Frédéric Koessler et al.ARTICLEEconometrica2014

    This article asks when communication with certifiable information leads to complete information revelation. We consider Bayesian games augmented by a pre-play communication phase in which announcements are made publicly. We first characterize the augmented games in which there exists a fully revealing sequential equilibrium with extremal beliefs (i.e., any deviation is attributed to a single type of the deviator). Next, we define a class of games…

  • Using or hiding private information? An experimental study of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information

    Open AccessNicolas Jacquemet, Frédéric KoesslerARTICLEGames and Economic Behavior2012

  • Information aggregation and belief elicitation in experimental parimutuel betting markets

    Open AccessFrédéric Koessler, Charles Noussair et al.ARTICLEJournal of Economic Behavior &…2012

  • When does a firm disclose product information

    Open AccessFrédéric Koessler, Régis RenaultARTICLEThe RAND Journal of Economics2012

    A firm chooses a price and the product information it discloses to a consumer whose tastes are privately known. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the match function for full disclosure to be the unique equilibrium outcome whatever the costs and prior beliefs about product and consumer types. It allows for products with different qualities as well as some horizontal match heterogeneity. With independently distributed product and c…

  • Committing to transparency to resist corruption

    Open AccessFrédéric Koessler, Ariane Lambert‐Mogiliansky et al.ARTICLEJournal of Development Economics2012Cited by: 1

  • Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

    Open AccessNicolas Jacquemet, Frédéric KoesslerARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2011

  • Strategic Communication Networks

    Jeanne Hagenbach, Frédéric KoesslerARTICLEThe Review of Economic Studies2009

    We consider situations in which every agent would like to take an action that is coordinated with those of others, as well as close to a common state of nature, with the ideal proximity to that state varying across agents. Before this coordination game is played, agents decide to whom they reveal their private information about the state. The information transmission occurring in the cheap-talk communication stage is characterized by a strategic …

  • Long persuasion games

    Open AccessFrançoise Forges, Frédéric KoesslerARTICLEJournal of Economic Theory2008

  • Lobbying with two audiences

    Open AccessFrédéric KoesslerARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2008References: 14

  • Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations

    Open AccessPhilippe Jehiel, Frédéric KoesslerARTICLEGames and Economic Behavior2007

  • Biais en faveur de l'outsider et nature des mises sur un marché expérimental de pari mutuel

    Marie‐Hélène Broihanne, Marie-Hélène Broihanne et al.ARTICLERevue économique2005References: 5

    Cet article étudie la présence, la persistance et la robustesse vis-à-vis de la nature des montants monétaires misés du biais en faveur de l’outsider dans un marché expérimental de pari mutuel. Le protocole expérimental considéré est le plus simple possible : chaque parieur mise en séquence une unité monétaire sur l’une des deux alternatives disponibles, l’ordre dans lequel les parieurs prennent leurs décisions est fixé de manière exogène, et le …

  • Coordination des politiques budgétaires et monétaires dans l'uem en présence de chocs et d'informations asymétriques

    Sylvie Duchassaing, Frédéric KoesslerARTICLERevue économique2004References: 1

    Cet article analyse les interactions stratégiques entre la Banque centrale européenne et les États membres de la zone euro dans un modèle où chaque gouvernement détient des informations privées sur le choc affectant sa propre économie. Nous nous intéressons aux conséquences de ces asymétries d’information sur les décisions budgétaires et monétaires puis nous étudions les possibilités de manipulation d’information par les États membres. Nous montr…