Certifiable Pre-Play Communication
Full Disclosure
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19039641 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jeanne Hagenbach (0000-0003-2372-8718, corresponding author), Frédéric Koessler (0000-0001-7707-4217), Eduardo Perez-Richet (0000-0001-6876-4603) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 82 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 1093-1131 |
| Publication date | 2014-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Econometrica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-9682 • E-ISSN: 1468-0262 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.3982/ecta11070 |
| OpenAlex | W1843393153 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
| References cited | 5 |
This article asks when communication with certifiable information leads to complete information revelation. We consider Bayesian games augmented by a pre-play communication phase in which announcements are made publicly. We first characterize the augmented games in which there exists a fully revealing sequential equilibrium with extremal beliefs (i.e., any deviation is attributed to a single type of the deviator). Next, we define a class of games for which existence of a fully revealing equilibrium is equivalent to a richness property of the evidence structure. This characterization enables us to provide different sets of sufficient conditions for full information disclosure that encompass and extend all known results in the literature, and are easily applicable. We use these conditions to obtain new insights in games with strategic complementarities, voting with deliberation, and persuasion games with multidimensional types
Business · Economics · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems
When does coordination require centralization? The roles of organizational inertia and diversity
Decentralized advice
Tailored recommendations on a matching platform
Understanding influence in informational lobbying
Full disclosure in decentralized organizations
Selective memory of a psychological agent
Evidence reading mechanisms
Informed Information Design
The scope of provability
Bias and Negligence with Freedom of Information
| Citations per year | 0.91 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2015 - 2025 (11) |
| Highly cited | No |