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Alexandre Mas

Biographic Data

ID5867753
NAMEAlexandre Mas
GIVEN NAMESAlexandre
FAMILY NAMEMas
SIGNATUREMAS A
AFFILIATIONSPrinceton University
ORCID0000-0001-7077-0770
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS11
TOTAL CITATIONS43
WORKS AS AUTHOR11
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2004
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2022
H-INDEX2
  • Wage Posting or Wage Bargaining? A Test Using Dual Jobholders

    Marta Lachowska, Alexandre Mas et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Labor Economics•2022

    We employ a revealed preference test to distinguish between wage posting and wage bargaining. Using a sample of dual jobholders in Washington State, we estimate the sensitivity of wages and separation rates to wage shocks in a secondary job. In lower parts of the wage distribution, improvements in the outside option lead to higher separations rates but not to higher wages, consistent with wage posting. In the highest wage quartile, improved outsi…

  • Introduction to a Special Issue in Honor of Alan B. Krueger

    David Card, Alexandre Mas•ARTICLE•Journal of Labor Economics•2022

  • Potential Unemployment Insurance Duration and Labor Supply

    Andrew C Johnston, Alexandre Mas•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2018•Cited by: 2

    We examine how a 16-week cut in potential unemployment insurance (UI) duration in Missouri affected search behavior of UI recipients and the aggregate labor market. Using a regression discontinuity design (RDD), we estimate marginal effects of maximum duration on UI and nonemployment spells of 0.45 and 0.25, respectively. We simulate the unemployment rate implied by the RDD estimates assuming no market-level externalities. The implied response cl…

  • Valuing Alternative Work Arrangements

    Alexandre Mas, Amanda Pallais•ARTICLE•American Economic Review•2017

    We employ a discrete choice experiment in the employment process for a national call center to estimate the willingness to pay distribution for alternative work arrangements relative to traditional office positions. Most workers are not willing to pay for scheduling flexibility, though a tail of workers with high valuations allows for sizable compensating differentials. The average worker is willing to give up 20 percent of wages to avoid a sched…

  • The Evolution of Rotation Group Bias

    Alan B Krueger, Alexandre Mas et al.•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•2017

    We document that rotation group bias—the tendency for the unemployment rate to vary systematically by month in sample—in the Current Population Survey (CPS) has worsened over time. Estimated unemployment rates for earlier rotation groups have grown sharply relative to later rotation groups; both should be nationally representative samples. This bias increased discretely after the 1994 CPS redesign, and rising nonresponse rates are likely a signif…

  • Does Transparency Lead to Pay Compression

    Alexandre Mas•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2017•Cited by: 12•References: 6

    This paper asks whether pay disclosure in the public sector changes wage setting at the top of the distribution. I examine a 2010 California mandate that required municipal salaries to be posted online. Among top managers, disclosure led to approximately 7 percent average compensation declines, and a 75 percent increase in their quit rate, relative to managers in cities that had already disclosed salaries. The wage cuts were largely nominal. Wage…

  • Inequality at Work

    David Card, Alexandre Mas et al.•ARTICLE•American Economic Review•2012

    We study the effect of disclosing information on peers' salaries on workers' job satisfaction and job search intentions. A randomly chosen subset of University of California employees was informed about a new website listing the pay of University employees. All employees were then surveyed about their job satisfaction and job search intentions. Workers with salaries below the median for their pay unit and occupation report lower pay and job satis…

  • Peers at Work

    Alexandre Mas, Enrico Moretti•ARTICLE•American Economic Review•2009

    We study peer effects in the workplace. Specifically, we investigate whether, how, and why the productivity of a worker depends on the productivity of coworkers in the same team. Using high-frequency data on worker productivity from a large supermarket chain, we find strong evidence of positive productivity spillovers from the introduction of highly productive personnel into a shift. Worker effort is positively related to the productivity of work…

  • Tipping and the Dynamics of Segregation

    David Card, Alexandre Mas et al.•ARTICLE•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•2008

    Schelling (“Dynamic Models of Segregation,” Journal of Mathematical Sociology 1 (1971), 143–186) showed that extreme segregation can arise from social interactions in white preferences: once the minority share in a neighborhood exceeds a “tipping point,” all the whites leave. We use regression discontinuity methods and Census tract data from 1970 through 2000 to test for discontinuities in the dynamics of neighborhood racial composition. We find …

  • Pay, Reference Points, and Police Performance

    Alexandre Mas•ARTICLE•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•2006

    Several theories suggest that pay raises below a reference point will reduce job performance. Final offer arbitration for police unions provides a unique opportunity to examine these theories, as the police officers either receive their requested wage or receive a lower one. In the months after New Jersey police officers lose in arbitration, arrest rates and average sentence length decline, and crime reports rise relative to when they win. These …

  • Strikes, Scabs, and Tread Separations

    Alan B Krueger, Alexandre Mas•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2004•Cited by: 29•References: 2

    This paper provides a case study of the effect of labor relations on product quality. We consider whether a long, contentious strike and the hiring of replacement workers at Bridgestone/Firestone's Decatur, Illinois, plant in the mid-1990s contributed to the production of defective tires. Using several independent data sources and looking before and after the strike and across plants, we find that labor strife at the Decatur plant closely coincid…

  • Strikes, Scabs, and Tread Separations

    Alan B Krueger, Alexandre Mas•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2004•Cited by: 29•References: 2

    This paper provides a case study of the effect of labor relations on product quality. We consider whether a long, contentious strike and the hiring of replacement workers at Bridgestone/Firestone's Decatur, Illinois, plant in the mid-1990s contributed to the production of defective tires. Using several independent data sources and looking before and after the strike and across plants, we find that labor strife at the Decatur plant closely coincid…

  • Does Transparency Lead to Pay Compression

    Alexandre Mas•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2017•Cited by: 12•References: 6

    This paper asks whether pay disclosure in the public sector changes wage setting at the top of the distribution. I examine a 2010 California mandate that required municipal salaries to be posted online. Among top managers, disclosure led to approximately 7 percent average compensation declines, and a 75 percent increase in their quit rate, relative to managers in cities that had already disclosed salaries. The wage cuts were largely nominal. Wage…

  • Potential Unemployment Insurance Duration and Labor Supply

    Andrew C Johnston, Alexandre Mas•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2018•Cited by: 2

    We examine how a 16-week cut in potential unemployment insurance (UI) duration in Missouri affected search behavior of UI recipients and the aggregate labor market. Using a regression discontinuity design (RDD), we estimate marginal effects of maximum duration on UI and nonemployment spells of 0.45 and 0.25, respectively. We simulate the unemployment rate implied by the RDD estimates assuming no market-level externalities. The implied response cl…

  • Strikes, Scabs, and Tread Separations

    Alan B Krueger, Alexandre Mas•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2004•Cited by: 29•References: 2

    This paper provides a case study of the effect of labor relations on product quality. We consider whether a long, contentious strike and the hiring of replacement workers at Bridgestone/Firestone's Decatur, Illinois, plant in the mid-1990s contributed to the production of defective tires. Using several independent data sources and looking before and after the strike and across plants, we find that labor strife at the Decatur plant closely coincid…

  • Pay, Reference Points, and Police Performance

    Alexandre Mas•ARTICLE•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•2006

    Several theories suggest that pay raises below a reference point will reduce job performance. Final offer arbitration for police unions provides a unique opportunity to examine these theories, as the police officers either receive their requested wage or receive a lower one. In the months after New Jersey police officers lose in arbitration, arrest rates and average sentence length decline, and crime reports rise relative to when they win. These …

  • Tipping and the Dynamics of Segregation

    David Card, Alexandre Mas et al.•ARTICLE•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•2008

    Schelling (“Dynamic Models of Segregation,” Journal of Mathematical Sociology 1 (1971), 143–186) showed that extreme segregation can arise from social interactions in white preferences: once the minority share in a neighborhood exceeds a “tipping point,” all the whites leave. We use regression discontinuity methods and Census tract data from 1970 through 2000 to test for discontinuities in the dynamics of neighborhood racial composition. We find …

  • Peers at Work

    Alexandre Mas, Enrico Moretti•ARTICLE•American Economic Review•2009

    We study peer effects in the workplace. Specifically, we investigate whether, how, and why the productivity of a worker depends on the productivity of coworkers in the same team. Using high-frequency data on worker productivity from a large supermarket chain, we find strong evidence of positive productivity spillovers from the introduction of highly productive personnel into a shift. Worker effort is positively related to the productivity of work…

  • Inequality at Work

    David Card, Alexandre Mas et al.•ARTICLE•American Economic Review•2012

    We study the effect of disclosing information on peers' salaries on workers' job satisfaction and job search intentions. A randomly chosen subset of University of California employees was informed about a new website listing the pay of University employees. All employees were then surveyed about their job satisfaction and job search intentions. Workers with salaries below the median for their pay unit and occupation report lower pay and job satis…

  • Valuing Alternative Work Arrangements

    Alexandre Mas, Amanda Pallais•ARTICLE•American Economic Review•2017

    We employ a discrete choice experiment in the employment process for a national call center to estimate the willingness to pay distribution for alternative work arrangements relative to traditional office positions. Most workers are not willing to pay for scheduling flexibility, though a tail of workers with high valuations allows for sizable compensating differentials. The average worker is willing to give up 20 percent of wages to avoid a sched…

  • The Evolution of Rotation Group Bias

    Alan B Krueger, Alexandre Mas et al.•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•2017

    We document that rotation group bias—the tendency for the unemployment rate to vary systematically by month in sample—in the Current Population Survey (CPS) has worsened over time. Estimated unemployment rates for earlier rotation groups have grown sharply relative to later rotation groups; both should be nationally representative samples. This bias increased discretely after the 1994 CPS redesign, and rising nonresponse rates are likely a signif…

  • Does Transparency Lead to Pay Compression

    Alexandre Mas•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2017•Cited by: 12•References: 6

    This paper asks whether pay disclosure in the public sector changes wage setting at the top of the distribution. I examine a 2010 California mandate that required municipal salaries to be posted online. Among top managers, disclosure led to approximately 7 percent average compensation declines, and a 75 percent increase in their quit rate, relative to managers in cities that had already disclosed salaries. The wage cuts were largely nominal. Wage…

  • Potential Unemployment Insurance Duration and Labor Supply

    Andrew C Johnston, Alexandre Mas•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2018•Cited by: 2

    We examine how a 16-week cut in potential unemployment insurance (UI) duration in Missouri affected search behavior of UI recipients and the aggregate labor market. Using a regression discontinuity design (RDD), we estimate marginal effects of maximum duration on UI and nonemployment spells of 0.45 and 0.25, respectively. We simulate the unemployment rate implied by the RDD estimates assuming no market-level externalities. The implied response cl…

  • Wage Posting or Wage Bargaining? A Test Using Dual Jobholders

    Marta Lachowska, Alexandre Mas et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Labor Economics•2022

    We employ a revealed preference test to distinguish between wage posting and wage bargaining. Using a sample of dual jobholders in Washington State, we estimate the sensitivity of wages and separation rates to wage shocks in a secondary job. In lower parts of the wage distribution, improvements in the outside option lead to higher separations rates but not to higher wages, consistent with wage posting. In the highest wage quartile, improved outsi…

  • Introduction to a Special Issue in Honor of Alan B. Krueger

    David Card, Alexandre Mas•ARTICLE•Journal of Labor Economics•2022

Economics (10 works) · Labour economics (8 works) · Demographic economics (5 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (4 works) · Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics (4 works) · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Social Psychology (4 works) · Law (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works)

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