Alex Gershkov
Biographic Data
| ID | 5868113 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Alex Gershkov |
| GIVEN NAMES | Alex |
| FAMILY NAME | Gershkov |
| SIGNATURE | GERSHKOV A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Lancaster University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6062-8428 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Gainers and Losers in Priority Services
We analyze the implications of priority service (PS) on customers’ welfare. In monopoly markets, PS can often decrease consumer surplus and can even yield a loss of welfare to all consumers. This happens despite its efficiency gains, as monopolists levy in revenue more than the total efficiency gains. PS can increase consumer surplus if it expands the consumption coverage—that is, if it introduces new customers who would not purchase the service …
A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations
We derive the symmetric, revenue-maximizing allocation of several units among agents who take costly actions that influence their values. The problem is equivalent to a reduced-form model where agents have nonexpected utility. The uniform-price auction and the discriminatory pay-your-bid auction with reserve prices that react to both demand and supply constitute symmetric, optimal mechanisms. We also identify a condition under which the overall o…
A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations
We derive the symmetric, revenue-maximizing allocation of several units among agents who take costly actions that influence their values. The problem is equivalent to a reduced-form model where agents have nonexpected utility. The uniform-price auction and the discriminatory pay-your-bid auction with reserve prices that react to both demand and supply constitute symmetric, optimal mechanisms. We also identify a condition under which the overall o…
A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations
We derive the symmetric, revenue-maximizing allocation of several units among agents who take costly actions that influence their values. The problem is equivalent to a reduced-form model where agents have nonexpected utility. The uniform-price auction and the discriminatory pay-your-bid auction with reserve prices that react to both demand and supply constitute symmetric, optimal mechanisms. We also identify a condition under which the overall o…
Gainers and Losers in Priority Services
We analyze the implications of priority service (PS) on customers’ welfare. In monopoly markets, PS can often decrease consumer surplus and can even yield a loss of welfare to all consumers. This happens despite its efficiency gains, as monopolists levy in revenue more than the total efficiency gains. PS can increase consumer surplus if it expands the consumption coverage—that is, if it introduces new customers who would not purchase the service …
Economics (2 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (2 works) · Auction theory (1 work) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 work) · Common value auction (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work) · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing (1 work) · Download (1 work) · Economic history (1 work) · Finance (1 work)