A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10175457 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alex Gershkov (0000-0002-6062-8428, University of Surrey), Benny Moldovanu (University of Bonn), Philipp Strack (0000-0002-7960-9243, Yale University), Mengxi Zhang (0000-0002-2996-5346, University of Bonn) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 129 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1011-1051 |
| Publication date | 2020-11-19 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/712735 |
| OpenAlex | W2782719421 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 34 |
We derive the symmetric, revenue-maximizing allocation of several units among agents who take costly actions that influence their values. The problem is equivalent to a reduced-form model where agents have nonexpected utility. The uniform-price auction and the discriminatory pay-your-bid auction with reserve prices that react to both demand and supply constitute symmetric, optimal mechanisms. We also identify a condition under which the overall optimal mechanism is indeed symmetric and illustrate the structure of the optimal asymmetric mechanism when the condition fails. The main tool in our analysis is an integral inequality based on Fan and Lorentz (1954)
Auction theory · Common value auction · Economics · Mathematical economics · Mechanism (biology · Microeconomics · Revenue · Revenue equivalence · Vickrey auction · Auction Theory and Applications · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Finance
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2025 (4) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |