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Philipp Strack

Biographic Data

ID5868115
NAMEPhilipp Strack
GIVEN NAMESPhilipp
FAMILY NAMEStrack
SIGNATURESTRACK P
AFFILIATIONSYale University
ORCID0000-0002-7960-9243
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS5
TOTAL CITATIONS5
AUTHOR COUNT5
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2018
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2024
H-INDEX1
  • Selective-Memory Equilibrium

    Drew Fudenberg, Giacomo Lanzani et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2024•References: 1

    We study agents who are more likely to remember some experiences than others but update beliefs as if the experiences they remember are the only ones that occurred. To understand the long-run effects of selective memory, we propose selective-memory equilibrium. We show that if the agent’s behavior converges, their limit strategy is a selective-memory equilibrium, and we provide a sufficient condition for behavior to converge. We use this equilibr…

  • A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations

    Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2020•Cited by: 1

    We derive the symmetric, revenue-maximizing allocation of several units among agents who take costly actions that influence their values. The problem is equivalent to a reduced-form model where agents have nonexpected utility. The uniform-price auction and the discriminatory pay-your-bid auction with reserve prices that react to both demand and supply constitute symmetric, optimal mechanisms. We also identify a condition under which the overall o…

  • Turning Up the Heat

    Dawei Fang, Thomas H Noe et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2019•Cited by: 1•References: 4

    We study contests in which contestants are homogeneous and have convex effort costs. Increasing contest competitiveness, by making prizes more unequal, scaling up the competition, or adding new contestants, always discourages effort. These results have significant implications: although often criticized as evidence of laxity or cronyism, muting competition (e.g., adopting softer grading curves or less high-powered promotion systems) can both redu…

  • Stochastic Dominance under Independent Noise

    Luciano Pomatto, Philipp Strack et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2019•Cited by: 3

    Stochastic dominance is a crucial tool for the analysis of choice under risk. It is typically analyzed as a property of two gambles that are taken in isolation. We study how additional independent sources of risk (e.g., uninsurable labor risk, house price risk) can affect the ordering of gambles. We show that, perhaps surprisingly, background risk can be strong enough to render lotteries that are ranked by their expectation ranked in terms of fir…

  • Convergence in Misspecified Learning Models with Endogenous Actions

    Open Access•Paul Heidhues, Botond Kőszegi et al.•ARTICLE•SSRN Electronic Journal•2018

  • Stochastic Dominance under Independent Noise

    Luciano Pomatto, Philipp Strack et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2019•Cited by: 3

    Stochastic dominance is a crucial tool for the analysis of choice under risk. It is typically analyzed as a property of two gambles that are taken in isolation. We study how additional independent sources of risk (e.g., uninsurable labor risk, house price risk) can affect the ordering of gambles. We show that, perhaps surprisingly, background risk can be strong enough to render lotteries that are ranked by their expectation ranked in terms of fir…

  • A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations

    Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2020•Cited by: 1

    We derive the symmetric, revenue-maximizing allocation of several units among agents who take costly actions that influence their values. The problem is equivalent to a reduced-form model where agents have nonexpected utility. The uniform-price auction and the discriminatory pay-your-bid auction with reserve prices that react to both demand and supply constitute symmetric, optimal mechanisms. We also identify a condition under which the overall o…

  • Turning Up the Heat

    Dawei Fang, Thomas H Noe et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2019•Cited by: 1•References: 4

    We study contests in which contestants are homogeneous and have convex effort costs. Increasing contest competitiveness, by making prizes more unequal, scaling up the competition, or adding new contestants, always discourages effort. These results have significant implications: although often criticized as evidence of laxity or cronyism, muting competition (e.g., adopting softer grading curves or less high-powered promotion systems) can both redu…

  • Convergence in Misspecified Learning Models with Endogenous Actions

    Open Access•Paul Heidhues, Botond Kőszegi et al.•ARTICLE•SSRN Electronic Journal•2018

  • Turning Up the Heat

    Dawei Fang, Thomas H Noe et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2019•Cited by: 1•References: 4

    We study contests in which contestants are homogeneous and have convex effort costs. Increasing contest competitiveness, by making prizes more unequal, scaling up the competition, or adding new contestants, always discourages effort. These results have significant implications: although often criticized as evidence of laxity or cronyism, muting competition (e.g., adopting softer grading curves or less high-powered promotion systems) can both redu…

  • Stochastic Dominance under Independent Noise

    Luciano Pomatto, Philipp Strack et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2019•Cited by: 3

    Stochastic dominance is a crucial tool for the analysis of choice under risk. It is typically analyzed as a property of two gambles that are taken in isolation. We study how additional independent sources of risk (e.g., uninsurable labor risk, house price risk) can affect the ordering of gambles. We show that, perhaps surprisingly, background risk can be strong enough to render lotteries that are ranked by their expectation ranked in terms of fir…

  • A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations

    Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2020•Cited by: 1

    We derive the symmetric, revenue-maximizing allocation of several units among agents who take costly actions that influence their values. The problem is equivalent to a reduced-form model where agents have nonexpected utility. The uniform-price auction and the discriminatory pay-your-bid auction with reserve prices that react to both demand and supply constitute symmetric, optimal mechanisms. We also identify a condition under which the overall o…

  • Selective-Memory Equilibrium

    Drew Fudenberg, Giacomo Lanzani et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2024•References: 1

    We study agents who are more likely to remember some experiences than others but update beliefs as if the experiences they remember are the only ones that occurred. To understand the long-run effects of selective memory, we propose selective-memory equilibrium. We show that if the agent’s behavior converges, their limit strategy is a selective-memory equilibrium, and we provide a sufficient condition for behavior to converge. We use this equilibr…

Economics (5 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Game Theory and Applications (3 works) · Mathematical economics (3 works) · Advanced Bandit Algorithms Research (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Econometrics (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Auction theory (1 work)

Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae