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Jacob Glazer

Biographic Data

ID5869065
NAMEJacob Glazer
GIVEN NAMESJacob
FAMILY NAMEGlazer
SIGNATUREGLAZER J
AFFILIATIONSTel Aviv University
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS6
TOTAL CITATIONS5
WORKS AS AUTHOR6
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1990
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2020
H-INDEX1
  • Fake Reviews

    Open Access•Jacob Glazer, Helios Herrera et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2020•References: 1

    We propose a model of product reviews in which some are genuine and some are fake in order to shed light on the value of information provided on platforms like TripAdvisor, Yelp, etc. In every period, a review is posted which is either genuine or fake. We characterise the equilibrium of the dynamic model and prove that it is unique. In equilibrium, valuable learning takes place in every period. Fake reviews, however, do slow down the learning pro…

  • The Inverse U-Shaped Religion–Health Connection Among Israeli Jews

    Open Access•Shuli Brammli-Greenberg, Jacob Glazer et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Religion and Health•2018

  • A Model of Persuasion with Boundedly Rational Agents

    Jacob Glazer, Ariel Rubinstein•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2012•Cited by: 5

    A new model of persuasion is presented. A listener first announces and commits to a codex (i.e., a set of conditions). The speaker then presents a (not necessarily true) profile that must satisfy the codex in order for the listener to be persuaded. The speaker is boundedly rational in the sense that his ability to come up with a persuasive profile is limited and depends on the true profile and the content and framing of the codex. The circumstanc…

  • Why Don't Private Employers Use Risk Adjustment? Conference Overview

    Open Access•Jacob Glazer, Thomas G Mcguire•ARTICLE•INQUIRY The Journal of Health…•2001

    In spite of advice from some researchers, private employers do not use formal risk adjustment to pay health plans. A conference, “Private Employers and Risk Adjustment,” was held in February 2000 to consider the meaning of employers' actions. This overview introduces the papers written for that conference

  • Private Employers Don't Need Formal Risk Adjustment

    Open Access•Jacob Glazer, Thomas G Mcguire•ARTICLE•INQUIRY The Journal of Health…•2001

    This paper lays down a set of hypotheses to explain why private employers do not use formal risk adjustment. The theme running through these hypotheses is simple: private employers don't need formal adjustment because they have better tools for dealing with adverse selection than formal risk adjustment provides. Open enrollment provisions, premium negotiations, and restricting employees' choices of health plans are mechanisms superior to formal r…

  • The scope for collusive behavior among debtor countries

    Open Access•Raquel Fernández-González, Raquel Fernández et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1990

    We study the question of whether there exist strategies whereby countries are able to sustain a cartel or collusive behavior when bargaining with a bank over the amount of debt to be repaid. We show that despite the existence of economies to scale in bargaining--if commitment were possible the countries would benefit from joint bargaining--a debtors' cartel will not emerge in equilibrium (in the absence of credible commitment mechanisms). A uniqu…

  • A Model of Persuasion with Boundedly Rational Agents

    Jacob Glazer, Ariel Rubinstein•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2012•Cited by: 5

    A new model of persuasion is presented. A listener first announces and commits to a codex (i.e., a set of conditions). The speaker then presents a (not necessarily true) profile that must satisfy the codex in order for the listener to be persuaded. The speaker is boundedly rational in the sense that his ability to come up with a persuasive profile is limited and depends on the true profile and the content and framing of the codex. The circumstanc…

  • The scope for collusive behavior among debtor countries

    Open Access•Raquel Fernández-González, Raquel Fernández et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1990

    We study the question of whether there exist strategies whereby countries are able to sustain a cartel or collusive behavior when bargaining with a bank over the amount of debt to be repaid. We show that despite the existence of economies to scale in bargaining--if commitment were possible the countries would benefit from joint bargaining--a debtors' cartel will not emerge in equilibrium (in the absence of credible commitment mechanisms). A uniqu…

  • Why Don't Private Employers Use Risk Adjustment? Conference Overview

    Open Access•Jacob Glazer, Thomas G Mcguire•ARTICLE•INQUIRY The Journal of Health…•2001

    In spite of advice from some researchers, private employers do not use formal risk adjustment to pay health plans. A conference, “Private Employers and Risk Adjustment,” was held in February 2000 to consider the meaning of employers' actions. This overview introduces the papers written for that conference

  • Private Employers Don't Need Formal Risk Adjustment

    Open Access•Jacob Glazer, Thomas G Mcguire•ARTICLE•INQUIRY The Journal of Health…•2001

    This paper lays down a set of hypotheses to explain why private employers do not use formal risk adjustment. The theme running through these hypotheses is simple: private employers don't need formal adjustment because they have better tools for dealing with adverse selection than formal risk adjustment provides. Open enrollment provisions, premium negotiations, and restricting employees' choices of health plans are mechanisms superior to formal r…

  • A Model of Persuasion with Boundedly Rational Agents

    Jacob Glazer, Ariel Rubinstein•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2012•Cited by: 5

    A new model of persuasion is presented. A listener first announces and commits to a codex (i.e., a set of conditions). The speaker then presents a (not necessarily true) profile that must satisfy the codex in order for the listener to be persuaded. The speaker is boundedly rational in the sense that his ability to come up with a persuasive profile is limited and depends on the true profile and the content and framing of the codex. The circumstanc…

  • The Inverse U-Shaped Religion–Health Connection Among Israeli Jews

    Open Access•Shuli Brammli-Greenberg, Jacob Glazer et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Religion and Health•2018

  • Fake Reviews

    Open Access•Jacob Glazer, Helios Herrera et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2020•References: 1

    We propose a model of product reviews in which some are genuine and some are fake in order to shed light on the value of information provided on platforms like TripAdvisor, Yelp, etc. In every period, a review is posted which is either genuine or fake. We characterise the equilibrium of the dynamic model and prove that it is unique. In equilibrium, valuable learning takes place in every period. Fake reviews, however, do slow down the learning pro…

Business (4 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Economics (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Actuarial science (2 works) · Advertising (2 works) · Game Theory and Applications (2 works) · Global Health Care Issues (2 works) · Healthcare Policy and Management (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works)

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