Private Employers Don't Need Formal Risk Adjustment
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 13774641 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jacob Glazer (Tel Aviv University, corresponding author), Thomas G Mcguire |
| Year | 2001 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 260-269 |
| Publication date | 2001-08-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | INQUIRY The Journal of Health Care Organization Provision and Financing (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0046-9580 • E-ISSN: 1945-7243 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.5034/inquiryjrnl_38.3.260 |
| PMID | 11761353 |
| OpenAlex | W1973948007 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 16 |
This paper lays down a set of hypotheses to explain why private employers do not use formal risk adjustment. The theme running through these hypotheses is simple: private employers don't need formal adjustment because they have better tools for dealing with adverse selection than formal risk adjustment provides. Open enrollment provisions, premium negotiations, and restricting employees' choices of health plans are mechanisms superior to formal risk adjustment for dealing with problems caused by adverse selection
Actuarial science · Adverse selection · Business · Negotiation · Political science · Selection (genetic algorithm · Set (abstract data type · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis · Global Health Care Issues · Healthcare Policy and Management · Law
| Citations per year | 0.2 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2001 - 2013 (13) |
| Highly cited | No |