Formal Risk Adjustment by Private Employers
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 13775178 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Randall P Ellis (0000-0003-2176-5347, Boston University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2001 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 299-309 |
| Publication date | 2001-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | INQUIRY The Journal of Health Care Organization Provision and Financing (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0046-9580 • E-ISSN: 1945-7243 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.5034/inquiryjrnl_38.3.299 |
| PMID | 11761357 |
| OpenAlex | W2021487682 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 18 |
This paper explores explanations for why few private employers have adopted formal risk adjustment. The lack of data, challenges of using highly imperfect signals, and absence of market power are not compelling explanations. Alternative strategies that reduce selection problems are clearly important. The central argument is that U.S. health markets are not in equilibrium, but rather are changing rapidly. Since many agents-consumers, employers, health plans, and providers--do not currently demand formal risk adjustment, it is not surprising that adoption has been slow. Recent changes in health plan markets may change the demand and accelerate future adoption
Actuarial science · Adverse selection · Argument (complex analysis · Business · Economics · Health risk · Imperfect · Microeconomics · Public economics · Risk analysis (engineering · Global Health Care Issues · Healthcare Policy and Management · Primary Care and Health Outcomes
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.12 |
| Citation span | 2001 - 2013 (13) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |