Luca Castaldo
Biographic Data
| ID | 5910867 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Luca Castaldo |
| GIVEN NAMES | Luca |
| FAMILY NAME | Castaldo |
| SIGNATURE | CASTALDO L |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Florence |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3103-8568 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Saving logic from paradox via nonclassical recapture
The Liar paradox arguably shows that a coherent and self-applicable notion of truth is governed by nonclassical logic. It then seems natural to conclude that classical logic is inadequate for defining a truth theory. In this article, we argue that this is not the case. In the spirit of Reinhardt (Math Logic Formal Syst 94:227, 1985; J Philos Logic 15:219–251, 1986), and in analogy with Hilbert’s program for the foundation of classical mathematics…
Implicit commitments of instrumental acceptance
When accepting an axiomatic theory S, we are implicitly committed to various statements that are independent of its axioms. Examples of such implicit commitments include consistency statements and reflection principles for S. While foundational acceptance has received considerable attention in this context, the study of implicit commitments triggered by weaker notions remains underdeveloped. This article extends the analysis investigating implici…
On the Costs of Classical Logic
This article compares classical (or -like) and nonclassical (or -like) axiomatisations of the fixed-point semantics developed by Kripke (J Philos 72(19): 690–716, 1975). Following the line of investigation of Halbach and Nicolai (J Philos Logic 47(2): 227–257, 2018), we do not compare and qua theories of truth simpliciter, but rather qua axiomatisations of the Kripkean conception of truth. We strengthen the central results of Halbach and Nicolai …
No prominent works on this page.
On the Costs of Classical Logic
This article compares classical (or -like) and nonclassical (or -like) axiomatisations of the fixed-point semantics developed by Kripke (J Philos 72(19): 690–716, 1975). Following the line of investigation of Halbach and Nicolai (J Philos Logic 47(2): 227–257, 2018), we do not compare and qua theories of truth simpliciter, but rather qua axiomatisations of the Kripkean conception of truth. We strengthen the central results of Halbach and Nicolai …
Saving logic from paradox via nonclassical recapture
The Liar paradox arguably shows that a coherent and self-applicable notion of truth is governed by nonclassical logic. It then seems natural to conclude that classical logic is inadequate for defining a truth theory. In this article, we argue that this is not the case. In the spirit of Reinhardt (Math Logic Formal Syst 94:227, 1985; J Philos Logic 15:219–251, 1986), and in analogy with Hilbert’s program for the foundation of classical mathematics…
Implicit commitments of instrumental acceptance
When accepting an axiomatic theory S, we are implicitly committed to various statements that are independent of its axioms. Examples of such implicit commitments include consistency statements and reflection principles for S. While foundational acceptance has received considerable attention in this context, the study of implicit commitments triggered by weaker notions remains underdeveloped. This article extends the analysis investigating implici…
Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Census and Population Estimation (1 work) · Child and Animal Learning Development (1 work) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (1 work) · Discrete mathematics (1 work) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (1 work) · Mark and recapture (1 work) · Mathematical economics (1 work)