Implicit commitments of instrumental acceptance
A case study
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10344225 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Luca Castaldo (0000-0002-3103-8568, University of Florence), Mary Glowacki (0000-0001-6678-7107, University of Warsaw) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 76 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 851-879 |
| Publication date | 2024-09-20 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqae108 |
| OpenAlex | W4402686339 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 28 |
When accepting an axiomatic theory S, we are implicitly committed to various statements that are independent of its axioms. Examples of such implicit commitments include consistency statements and reflection principles for S. While foundational acceptance has received considerable attention in this context, the study of implicit commitments triggered by weaker notions remains underdeveloped. This article extends the analysis investigating implicit commitments inherent in instrumental acceptance, comparing them with the implicit commitments involved in foundational acceptance. Concentrating on Reinhardt’s instrumentalism vis-à-vis Kripke–Feferman theory of truth as a case study, we present a number of formal theories of acceptance motivated by Reinhardt’s program and we analyze their properties. We argue that, under reasonable assumptions, instrumental acceptance does entail non-trivial implicit commitments, yet weaker than those associated with foundational acceptance
Epistemology · Child and Animal Learning Development · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |