Karl Ekendahl
Biographic Data
| ID | 5910878 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Karl Ekendahl |
| GIVEN NAMES | Karl |
| FAMILY NAME | Ekendahl |
| SIGNATURE | EKENDAHL K |
| AFFILIATIONS | Uppsala University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2310-5844 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Death, Badness, and Well-Being at a Time
For more on this issue
Responding to the Timing Argument
According to the Timing Argument, death is not bad for the individual who dies, because there is no time at which it could be bad for her. Defenders of the badness of death have objected to this influential argument, typically by arguing that there are times at which death is bad for its victim. In this paper, I argue that a number of these writers have been concerned with quite different formulations of the Timing Argument. Further, and more imp…
Does Abortion Harm the Fetus
A central claim in abortion ethics is what might be called the Harm Claim – the claim that abortion harms the fetus. In this article, we put forward a simple and straightforward reason to reject the Harm Claim. Rather than invoking controversial assumptions about personal identity, or some nonstandard account of harm, as many other critics of the Harm Claim have done, we suggest that the aborted fetus cannot be harmed for the simple reason that i…
Saving People From the Harm of Death
Dead and Gone? Reply to Jenkins
In a recent article, Joyce L. Jenkins challenges the common belief that desire satisfactionists are committed to the view that a person's welfare can be affected by posthumous events. Jenkins argues that desire satisfactionists can and should say that posthumous events only play an epistemic role: though such events cannot harm me, they can reveal that I have already been harmed by something else. In this response, however, we show that Jenkins's…
Personal Value – By Toni Rønnow‐Rasmussen
No prominent works on this page.
Personal Value – By Toni Rønnow‐Rasmussen
Dead and Gone? Reply to Jenkins
In a recent article, Joyce L. Jenkins challenges the common belief that desire satisfactionists are committed to the view that a person's welfare can be affected by posthumous events. Jenkins argues that desire satisfactionists can and should say that posthumous events only play an epistemic role: though such events cannot harm me, they can reveal that I have already been harmed by something else. In this response, however, we show that Jenkins's…
Saving People From the Harm of Death
Does Abortion Harm the Fetus
A central claim in abortion ethics is what might be called the Harm Claim – the claim that abortion harms the fetus. In this article, we put forward a simple and straightforward reason to reject the Harm Claim. Rather than invoking controversial assumptions about personal identity, or some nonstandard account of harm, as many other critics of the Harm Claim have done, we suggest that the aborted fetus cannot be harmed for the simple reason that i…
Responding to the Timing Argument
According to the Timing Argument, death is not bad for the individual who dies, because there is no time at which it could be bad for her. Defenders of the badness of death have objected to this influential argument, typically by arguing that there are times at which death is bad for its victim. In this paper, I argue that a number of these writers have been concerned with quite different formulations of the Timing Argument. Further, and more imp…
Death, Badness, and Well-Being at a Time
For more on this issue
Philosophy (4 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Harm (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Theology and Philosophy of Evil (3 works) · Economics (2 works) · Social Psychology (2 works) · Social Psychology (2 works) · Aborted Fetus (1 work)