Responding to the Timing Argument
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21507906 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Karl Ekendahl (0000-0003-2310-5844, Department of Philosophy Uppsala University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 103 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 753-771 |
| Publication date | 2022-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Pacific philosophical quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0279-0750 • E-ISSN: 1468-0114 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/papq.12386 |
| OpenAlex | W3197274043 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 24 |
According to the Timing Argument, death is not bad for the individual who dies, because there is no time at which it could be bad for her. Defenders of the badness of death have objected to this influential argument, typically by arguing that there are times at which death is bad for its victim. In this paper, I argue that a number of these writers have been concerned with quite different formulations of the Timing Argument. Further, and more importantly, I show that their objections to the Timing Argument fail as attempts to refute the argument in its most challenging form
Argument map · Epistemology · Free Will and Agency · Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
The Philosophy of Death
Well-Being and Death
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death
Weighing Lives
The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers.
Dissolving Death’s Time-of-Harm Problem
Reviving Concurrentism About Death
Comparative Harm, Creation and Death
Mortal Harm
Less Good but Not Bad
Desire-satisfaction and Welfare as Temporal
| Citations per year | 1.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2025 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |