Alexander Greenberg
Biographic Data
| ID | 5910880 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Alexander Greenberg |
| GIVEN NAMES | Alexander |
| FAMILY NAME | Greenberg |
| SIGNATURE | GREENBERG A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Southampton |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2501-878X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Mental agency and rational subjectivity
Philosophy is witnessing an “Agential Turn,” characterised by the thought that explaining certain distinctive features of human mentality requires conceiving of many mental phenomena as acts , and of subjects as their agents . We raise a challenge for three central explanatory appeals to mental agency––agentialism about doxastic responsibility, agentialism about doxastic self‐knowledge, and an agentialist explanation of the delusion of thought in…
Could've known better
Could you have taken precautions against a risk you were unaware of? This question lies at the heart of debates in ethics and legal philosophy concerning whether it's justifiable to blame or punish those who cause harm inadvertently or out of ignorance. But the question is crucially ambiguous, depending on what is understood to be inside or outside the scope of the ‘could’. And this ambiguity undermines a number of arguments purporting to show th…
Why Criminal Responsibility for Negligence Cannot Be Indirect
A popular way to try to justify holding defendants criminally responsible for inadvertent negligence is via an indirect or “tracing” approach, namely an approach which traces the inadvertence back to prior culpable action. I argue that this indirect approach to criminal negligence fails because it cannot account for a key feature of how criminal negligence should be (and sometimes is) assessed. Specifically, it cannot account for why, when consid…
There is No (Sui Generis) Norm of Assertion
There are norms on action and norms on assertion. That is, there are things we should and shouldn't do, and things we should and shouldn't say. How do these two kinds of norm relate? Are norms on assertion reducible to norms on action? Many philosophers think they are not. These philosophers claim there is a sui generis norm specific to assertion, a norm which is also often claimed to be constitutive of assertion. Both claims, I argue, should be …
Should I believe all the truths
Should I believe something if and only if it’s true? Many philosophers have objected to this kind of truth norm, on the grounds that it’s not the case that one ought to believe all the truths. For example, some truths are too complex to believe; others are too trivial to be worth believing. Philosophers who defend truth norms often respond to this problem by reformulating truth norms in ways that do not entail that one ought to believe all the tr…
Should I believe all the truths
Should I believe something if and only if it’s true? Many philosophers have objected to this kind of truth norm, on the grounds that it’s not the case that one ought to believe all the truths. For example, some truths are too complex to believe; others are too trivial to be worth believing. Philosophers who defend truth norms often respond to this problem by reformulating truth norms in ways that do not entail that one ought to believe all the tr…
There is No (Sui Generis) Norm of Assertion
There are norms on action and norms on assertion. That is, there are things we should and shouldn't do, and things we should and shouldn't say. How do these two kinds of norm relate? Are norms on assertion reducible to norms on action? Many philosophers think they are not. These philosophers claim there is a sui generis norm specific to assertion, a norm which is also often claimed to be constitutive of assertion. Both claims, I argue, should be …
Should I believe all the truths
Should I believe something if and only if it’s true? Many philosophers have objected to this kind of truth norm, on the grounds that it’s not the case that one ought to believe all the truths. For example, some truths are too complex to believe; others are too trivial to be worth believing. Philosophers who defend truth norms often respond to this problem by reformulating truth norms in ways that do not entail that one ought to believe all the tr…
Why Criminal Responsibility for Negligence Cannot Be Indirect
A popular way to try to justify holding defendants criminally responsible for inadvertent negligence is via an indirect or “tracing” approach, namely an approach which traces the inadvertence back to prior culpable action. I argue that this indirect approach to criminal negligence fails because it cannot account for a key feature of how criminal negligence should be (and sometimes is) assessed. Specifically, it cannot account for why, when consid…
Mental agency and rational subjectivity
Philosophy is witnessing an “Agential Turn,” characterised by the thought that explaining certain distinctive features of human mentality requires conceiving of many mental phenomena as acts , and of subjects as their agents . We raise a challenge for three central explanatory appeals to mental agency––agentialism about doxastic responsibility, agentialism about doxastic self‐knowledge, and an agentialist explanation of the delusion of thought in…
Could've known better
Could you have taken precautions against a risk you were unaware of? This question lies at the heart of debates in ethics and legal philosophy concerning whether it's justifiable to blame or punish those who cause harm inadvertently or out of ignorance. But the question is crucially ambiguous, depending on what is understood to be inside or outside the scope of the ‘could’. And this ambiguity undermines a number of arguments purporting to show th…
Free Will and Agency (5 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Action (physics) (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Doxastic logic (2 works) · Norm (philosophy) (2 works)