Could've known better
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10344270 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alexander Greenberg (0000-0002-2501-878X, University of Southampton, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Publication date | 2024-10-22 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqae130 |
| OpenAlex | W4403621036 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 19 |
Could you have taken precautions against a risk you were unaware of? This question lies at the heart of debates in ethics and legal philosophy concerning whether it's justifiable to blame or punish those who cause harm inadvertently or out of ignorance. But the question is crucially ambiguous, depending on what is understood to be inside or outside the scope of the ‘could’. And this ambiguity undermines a number of arguments purporting to show that inadvertent wrongdoers cannot justifiably be blamed or punished. While not all opposition to blaming or punishing inadvertent wrongdoers rests on this ambiguity, some certainly does. And getting clear on this ambiguity is important if we're to sort good arguments against blaming and punishing inadvertent wrongdoers—if there are any—from bad ones
Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Torture, Ethics, and Law · War, Ethics, and Justification
Who Knew?
Omissions
Hard Luck
Should Criminal Law Mirror Moral Blameworthiness or Criminal Culpability? A Reply to Husak
Why Criminal Responsibility for Negligence Cannot Be Indirect
I.—A Plea for Excuses
Punishment and Responsibility
Skepticism about Moral Responsibility
Ought' Conversationally Implies `Can
| Highly cited | No |
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