Miguel Egler
Biographic Data
| ID | 5910884 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Miguel Egler |
| GIVEN NAMES | Miguel |
| FAMILY NAME | Egler |
| SIGNATURE | EGLER M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Tilburg University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5031-8178 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Phenomenally Skilful Intuitions
What makes some intuitions more skilful than others? To answer this question, I first argue that prominent phenomenalist views of intuition—which define intuitions as mental states with a unique phenomenology—cannot capture the distinction between skilful and unskilful intuitions. I then propose a desideratum for an account of skilful intuition: they must address the problem of intuitive presence . Lastly, I draw on extensive empirical work on me…
Who’s afraid of cognitive diversity
The Challenge from Cognitive Diversity (CCD) states that demography-specific intuitions are unsuited to play evidential roles in philosophy. The CCD attracted much attention in recent years, in great part due to the launch of an international research effort to test for demographic variation in philosophical intuitions. In the wake of these international studies the CCD may prove revolutionary. For, if these studies uncover demographic difference…
The Suspension Problem for Epistemic Democracy
Recently, many normative theories of democracy have taken an epistemic turn. Rather than focus on democracy's morally desirable features, they argue that democracy is valuable (at least in part) because it tends to produce correct political decisions. I argue that these theories place epistemic demands on citizens that conflict with core democratic commitments. First, I discuss a well-known challenge to epistemic arguments for democracy that I ca…
Why understanding-why is contrastive
Contrastivism about interrogative understanding is the view that ‘S understands why p ’ posits a three-place epistemic relation between a subject S, a fact p , and an alternative to p , q . This thesis stands in stark opposition to the natural idea that a subject S can be said to understand why p simpliciter . I argue that contrastivism offers the best explanation for the fact that evaluations of the form ‘S understands why p ’ vary depending on …
Philosophical expertise under the microscope
Recent experimental studies indicate that epistemically irrelevant factors can skew our intuitions, and that some degree of scepticism about appealing to intuition in philosophy is warranted. In response, some have claimed that philosophers are experts in such a way as to vindicate their reliance on intuitions—this has become known as the ‘expertise defence’. This paper explores the viability of the expertise defence, and suggests that it can be …
Philosophical expertise under the microscope
Recent experimental studies indicate that epistemically irrelevant factors can skew our intuitions, and that some degree of scepticism about appealing to intuition in philosophy is warranted. In response, some have claimed that philosophers are experts in such a way as to vindicate their reliance on intuitions—this has become known as the ‘expertise defence’. This paper explores the viability of the expertise defence, and suggests that it can be …
Philosophical expertise under the microscope
Recent experimental studies indicate that epistemically irrelevant factors can skew our intuitions, and that some degree of scepticism about appealing to intuition in philosophy is warranted. In response, some have claimed that philosophers are experts in such a way as to vindicate their reliance on intuitions—this has become known as the ‘expertise defence’. This paper explores the viability of the expertise defence, and suggests that it can be …
Why understanding-why is contrastive
Contrastivism about interrogative understanding is the view that ‘S understands why p ’ posits a three-place epistemic relation between a subject S, a fact p , and an alternative to p , q . This thesis stands in stark opposition to the natural idea that a subject S can be said to understand why p simpliciter . I argue that contrastivism offers the best explanation for the fact that evaluations of the form ‘S understands why p ’ vary depending on …
The Suspension Problem for Epistemic Democracy
Recently, many normative theories of democracy have taken an epistemic turn. Rather than focus on democracy's morally desirable features, they argue that democracy is valuable (at least in part) because it tends to produce correct political decisions. I argue that these theories place epistemic demands on citizens that conflict with core democratic commitments. First, I discuss a well-known challenge to epistemic arguments for democracy that I ca…
Who’s afraid of cognitive diversity
The Challenge from Cognitive Diversity (CCD) states that demography-specific intuitions are unsuited to play evidential roles in philosophy. The CCD attracted much attention in recent years, in great part due to the launch of an international research effort to test for demographic variation in philosophical intuitions. In the wake of these international studies the CCD may prove revolutionary. For, if these studies uncover demographic difference…
Phenomenally Skilful Intuitions
What makes some intuitions more skilful than others? To answer this question, I first argue that prominent phenomenalist views of intuition—which define intuitions as mental states with a unique phenomenology—cannot capture the distinction between skilful and unskilful intuitions. I then propose a desideratum for an account of skilful intuition: they must address the problem of intuitive presence . Lastly, I draw on extensive empirical work on me…
Epistemology (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Economics (2 works) · Experimental philosophy (2 works) · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies (2 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Law (2 works)