Phenomenally Skilful Intuitions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21461636 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Miguel Egler (0000-0002-5031-8178, Tilburg University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Publication date | 2026-07-02 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Erkenntnis (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0165-0106 • E-ISSN: 1572-8420 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s10670-026-01128-6 |
| OpenAlex | W7167084012 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 35 |
What makes some intuitions more skilful than others? To answer this question, I first argue that prominent phenomenalist views of intuition—which define intuitions as mental states with a unique phenomenology—cannot capture the distinction between skilful and unskilful intuitions. I then propose a desideratum for an account of skilful intuition: they must address the problem of intuitive presence . Lastly, I draw on extensive empirical work on metacognition and action control to argue that an enactivist view of intuition—which emphasises the role of mental actions in producing intuitions—both satisfies the proposed desideratum and offers a clear and plausible account of the nature of skilful intuition
Free will · Metaphysics · Ontology · Thought experiment · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
The Philosophy of Metacognition
The Philosophy of Philosophy
The Intellectual Given
Intuition, reason, and metacognition
A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness
An Experimental Study of Imagination
Skepticism and the Veil of Perception
Metacognitive Feelings
Moral intuition, strength, and metacognition
Metacognition of Inferential Transitions
Beyond Automaticity
Factive Phenomenal Characters
Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action
Automaticity
Mental action
The phenomenology of intuition
| Highly cited | No |
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