Helen Yetter‐Chappell
Biographic Data
| ID | 5910924 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Helen Yetter‐Chappell |
| GIVEN NAMES | Helen |
| FAMILY NAME | Yetter‐Chappell |
| SIGNATURE | CHAPPELL H Y |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of York |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3527-5306 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Guessing at Ghosts in the Machine
As AI grows ever more complex and ubiquitous, its moral status becomes increasingly pressing. But knowing whether an AI has moral status is only part of the ethical puzzle. To determine how we ought to treat such entities, we must know not only whether AIs have moral status, but also about the content of their interests—what contributes to their wellbeing. This paper will survey different accounts of wellbeing, arguing that regardless of which th…
Dualism all the way down
Dissolving Type‐b Physicalism
Knowledge, Thought, and the Case for Dualism
Knowledge, Thought, and the Case for Dualism offers a spirited defence of mind-body dualism. Richard Fumerton takes the mind-body problem to be inextricably connected to foundational issues in epistemology and philosophy of language. We cannot, he thinks, remain neutral on these issues and come to substantial conclusions on the nature of consciousness. If we are to make progress on consciousness, we must first undertake commitments elsewhere. Fou…
Knowledge, Thought, and the Case for Dualism
Knowledge, Thought, and the Case for Dualism offers a spirited defence of mind-body dualism. Richard Fumerton takes the mind-body problem to be inextricably connected to foundational issues in epistemology and philosophy of language. We cannot, he thinks, remain neutral on these issues and come to substantial conclusions on the nature of consciousness. If we are to make progress on consciousness, we must first undertake commitments elsewhere. Fou…
Dissolving Type‐b Physicalism
Dualism all the way down
Guessing at Ghosts in the Machine
As AI grows ever more complex and ubiquitous, its moral status becomes increasingly pressing. But knowing whether an AI has moral status is only part of the ethical puzzle. To determine how we ought to treat such entities, we must know not only whether AIs have moral status, but also about the content of their interests—what contributes to their wellbeing. This paper will survey different accounts of wellbeing, arguing that regardless of which th…
Epistemology (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Consciousness (2 works) · Dualism (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Mind–body problem (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works)