Knowledge, Thought, and the Case for Dualism

Knowledge, Thought, and the Case for Dualism offers a spirited defence of mind-body dualism. Richard Fumerton takes the mind-body problem to be inextricably connected to foundational issues in epistemology and philosophy of language. We cannot, he thinks, remain neutral on these issues and come to substantial conclusions on the nature of consciousness. If we are to make progress on consciousness, we must first undertake commitments elsewhere. Four theses are taken to jointly lead to dualism: (i) epistemic foundationalism, (ii) direct reference grounded in acquaintance, (iii) mental content internalism, and (iv) indirect grasp of physical objects. Fumerton suggests that the book be taken as a conditional defence of dualism—arguing that it follows from the conjunction of these theses. While this might seem to be a weakness (shrinking the audience down to those who agree on the background issues), I'm inclined to see it as a refreshing sort of honesty: laying out the assumptions, rather than burying them or minimizing their importance. I also think that the audience for the book should be broader than merely those who embrace these background assumptions, insofar as potential interconnections between subdisciplines should be of general interest to all involved in these debates

Consciousness · Dualism · Epistemology · Foundationalism · Internalism and externalism · Metaphysics · Mind–body problem · Philosophy of mind · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophy