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Jacob Ross

Biographic Data

ID5911248
NAMEJacob Ross
GIVEN NAMESJacob
FAMILY NAMERoss
SIGNATUREROSS J
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Southern California
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS8
TOTAL CITATIONS74
AUTHOR COUNT8
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1992
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2025
H-INDEX2
  • Evaluative Uncertainty and Permissible Preference

    Joe Horton, Jacob Ross•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2025•References: 46

    There has recently been an explosion of interest in rational and moral choice under evaluative uncertainty—uncertainty about values or reasons. However, the dominant views on such choice have at least three major problems: they are overly demanding, they are incompatible with supererogation, and they cannot be applied to agents with credence in indeterminate evaluative theories. The authors propose a unified view that solves all these problems. A…

  • Divided We Fall: Fission and the Failure of Self‐Interest

    Open Access•Jacob Ross•ARTICLE•Philosophical Perspectives•2014•References: 4

  • Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment 1

    Open Access•Jacob Ross, Mark Schroeder•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2012•Cited by: 67•References: 1

    This paper compares two alternative explanations of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge (i.e., the claim that whether an agent knows that p can depend on pragmatic factors). After reviewing the evidence for such pragmatic encroachment, we ask how it is best explained, assuming it obtains. Several authors have recently argued that the best explanation is provided by a particular account of belief, which we call pragmatic credal reductivism. On thi…

  • Sleeping Beauty, Countable Additivity, and Rational Dilemmas

    Jacob Ross•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2010•Cited by: 7•References: 33

    This essay argues that there is a conflict between the principle of Countable Additivity and standard views of how we should update centered or de se beliefs. The latter views, this essay argues, entail a general principle, which the essay calls the Generalized Thirder Principle, that conflicts with the principle of Countable Additivity. The essay then argues that the most plausible response to the conflict between these principles is to maintain…

  • Weighing Lives

    Jacob Ross•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2007

    Book Review| October 01 2007 Weighing Lives John Broome, Weighing Lives Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. ix + 278 pp. Jacob Ross Jacob Ross Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 663–666. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-021 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Permissions Search Site Citation Jacob Ross; Weighing Lives. The Philosophical Review 1 O…

  • The season of the souls

    Jacob Ross, J Brian Ross•ARTICLE•Wasafiri•2000

  • The Primacy of the Personalist Concept of God in Jewish Thought

    Jacob Ross, Jacob Joshua Ross•ARTICLE•Journal of Jewish Thought and…•1999

  • The Divine Command Theory in Jewish Thought: A Modern Phenomenon

    Jacob Ross, Jacob Joshua Ross•CHAPTER•Interpretation in Religion•1992

  • Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment 1

    Open Access•Jacob Ross, Mark Schroeder•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2012•Cited by: 67•References: 1

    This paper compares two alternative explanations of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge (i.e., the claim that whether an agent knows that p can depend on pragmatic factors). After reviewing the evidence for such pragmatic encroachment, we ask how it is best explained, assuming it obtains. Several authors have recently argued that the best explanation is provided by a particular account of belief, which we call pragmatic credal reductivism. On thi…

  • Sleeping Beauty, Countable Additivity, and Rational Dilemmas

    Jacob Ross•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2010•Cited by: 7•References: 33

    This essay argues that there is a conflict between the principle of Countable Additivity and standard views of how we should update centered or de se beliefs. The latter views, this essay argues, entail a general principle, which the essay calls the Generalized Thirder Principle, that conflicts with the principle of Countable Additivity. The essay then argues that the most plausible response to the conflict between these principles is to maintain…

  • The Divine Command Theory in Jewish Thought: A Modern Phenomenon

    Jacob Ross, Jacob Joshua Ross•CHAPTER•Interpretation in Religion•1992

  • The Primacy of the Personalist Concept of God in Jewish Thought

    Jacob Ross, Jacob Joshua Ross•ARTICLE•Journal of Jewish Thought and…•1999

  • The season of the souls

    Jacob Ross, J Brian Ross•ARTICLE•Wasafiri•2000

  • Weighing Lives

    Jacob Ross•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2007

    Book Review| October 01 2007 Weighing Lives John Broome, Weighing Lives Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. ix + 278 pp. Jacob Ross Jacob Ross Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 663–666. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-021 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Permissions Search Site Citation Jacob Ross; Weighing Lives. The Philosophical Review 1 O…

  • Sleeping Beauty, Countable Additivity, and Rational Dilemmas

    Jacob Ross•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2010•Cited by: 7•References: 33

    This essay argues that there is a conflict between the principle of Countable Additivity and standard views of how we should update centered or de se beliefs. The latter views, this essay argues, entail a general principle, which the essay calls the Generalized Thirder Principle, that conflicts with the principle of Countable Additivity. The essay then argues that the most plausible response to the conflict between these principles is to maintain…

  • Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment 1

    Open Access•Jacob Ross, Mark Schroeder•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2012•Cited by: 67•References: 1

    This paper compares two alternative explanations of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge (i.e., the claim that whether an agent knows that p can depend on pragmatic factors). After reviewing the evidence for such pragmatic encroachment, we ask how it is best explained, assuming it obtains. Several authors have recently argued that the best explanation is provided by a particular account of belief, which we call pragmatic credal reductivism. On thi…

  • Divided We Fall: Fission and the Failure of Self‐Interest

    Open Access•Jacob Ross•ARTICLE•Philosophical Perspectives•2014•References: 4

  • Evaluative Uncertainty and Permissible Preference

    Joe Horton, Jacob Ross•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2025•References: 46

    There has recently been an explosion of interest in rational and moral choice under evaluative uncertainty—uncertainty about values or reasons. However, the dominant views on such choice have at least three major problems: they are overly demanding, they are incompatible with supererogation, and they cannot be applied to agents with credence in indeterminate evaluative theories. The authors propose a unified view that solves all these problems. A…

Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Art (2 works) · Biblical Studies and Interpretation (2 works) · Citation (2 works) · History (2 works) · History (2 works)

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