Evaluative Uncertainty and Permissible Preference
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10692955 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Joe Horton (0000-0002-3703-4947, University College London), Jacob Ross (University of Southern California) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 134 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 35-64 |
| Publication date | 2025-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | Duke University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1215/00318108-11592163 |
| OpenAlex | W4407303237 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 48 |
There has recently been an explosion of interest in rational and moral choice under evaluative uncertainty—uncertainty about values or reasons. However, the dominant views on such choice have at least three major problems: they are overly demanding, they are incompatible with supererogation, and they cannot be applied to agents with credence in indeterminate evaluative theories. The authors propose a unified view that solves all these problems. According to this view, permissible options maximize expected utility relative to permissible preferences, and different kinds of permissibility for options correspond to different kinds of permissibility for preferences. Thus, rationally permissible options maximize expected utility relative to rationally permissible preferences, and morally permissible options maximize expected utility relative to morally permissible preferences. The authors argue that this view has more plausible implications than its rivals not only under evaluative uncertainty but also under ordinary uncertainty
Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Economics · Epistemology · Microeconomics · Positive economics · Preference · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Psychology
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| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |