Zeynep Soysal
Biographic Data
| ID | 5911440 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Zeynep Soysal |
| GIVEN NAMES | Zeynep |
| FAMILY NAME | Soysal |
| SIGNATURE | SOYSAL Z |
| AFFILIATIONS | Department of Philosophy University of Rochester Rochester NY 14627‐0078 |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7573-3239 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Idle Questions
In light of the problem of logical omniscience, some scholars have argued that belief is question-sensitive: agents don’t simply believe propositions but rather believe answers to questions. Hoek (2022) has recently developed a version of this approach on which a belief state is a “web” of questions and answers. Here, we present several challenges to Hoek’s question-sensitive account of belief. First, Hoek’s account is prone to very similar logic…
A Kripkean argument for descriptivism
In this paper, we offer a novel defense of descriptivism about reference. Our argument is based on principles about the relevance of speaker intentions to reference that are shared by many opponents of descriptivism, including Saul Kripke. We first show that two such principles that are plausibly endorsed by Kripke and other prominent externalists in fact entail descriptivism. The first principle states that when certain kinds of speaker intentio…
A metalinguistic and computational approach to the problem of mathematical omniscience
In this paper, I defend the metalinguistic solution to the problem of mathematical omniscience for the possible‐worlds account of propositions by combining it with a computational model of knowledge and belief. The metalinguistic solution states that the objects of belief and ignorance in mathematics are relations between mathematical sentences and what they express. The most pressing problem for the metalinguistic strategy is that it still ascri…
Why is the universe of sets not a set
From metasemantics to analyticity
In this paper, I argue from a metasemantic principle to the existence of analytic sentences. According to the metasemantic principle, an external feature is relevant to determining which concept one expresses with an expression only if one is disposed to treat this feature as relevant. This entails that if one isn’t disposed to treat external features as relevant to determining which concept one expresses, and one still expresses a given concept,…
From metasemantics to analyticity
In this paper, I argue from a metasemantic principle to the existence of analytic sentences. According to the metasemantic principle, an external feature is relevant to determining which concept one expresses with an expression only if one is disposed to treat this feature as relevant. This entails that if one isn’t disposed to treat external features as relevant to determining which concept one expresses, and one still expresses a given concept,…
Why is the universe of sets not a set
Why is the universe of sets not a set
From metasemantics to analyticity
In this paper, I argue from a metasemantic principle to the existence of analytic sentences. According to the metasemantic principle, an external feature is relevant to determining which concept one expresses with an expression only if one is disposed to treat this feature as relevant. This entails that if one isn’t disposed to treat external features as relevant to determining which concept one expresses, and one still expresses a given concept,…
A Kripkean argument for descriptivism
In this paper, we offer a novel defense of descriptivism about reference. Our argument is based on principles about the relevance of speaker intentions to reference that are shared by many opponents of descriptivism, including Saul Kripke. We first show that two such principles that are plausibly endorsed by Kripke and other prominent externalists in fact entail descriptivism. The first principle states that when certain kinds of speaker intentio…
A metalinguistic and computational approach to the problem of mathematical omniscience
In this paper, I defend the metalinguistic solution to the problem of mathematical omniscience for the possible‐worlds account of propositions by combining it with a computational model of knowledge and belief. The metalinguistic solution states that the objects of belief and ignorance in mathematics are relations between mathematical sentences and what they express. The most pressing problem for the metalinguistic strategy is that it still ascri…
Idle Questions
In light of the problem of logical omniscience, some scholars have argued that belief is question-sensitive: agents don’t simply believe propositions but rather believe answers to questions. Hoek (2022) has recently developed a version of this approach on which a belief state is a “web” of questions and answers. Here, we present several challenges to Hoek’s question-sensitive account of belief. First, Hoek’s account is prone to very similar logic…
Computer Science (5 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (3 works) · Law (2 works) · Linguistics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works)