A Kripkean argument for descriptivism

Bibliographic Data

ID21364036
AuthorsJens Kipper (0000-0002-8138-0855, Department of Philosophy University of Rochester Rochester NY 14627‐0078), Zeynep Soysal (0000-0002-7573-3239, Department of Philosophy University of Rochester Rochester NY 14627‐0078, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume56
Issue3
Pages654-669
Publication date2022-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueNoûs (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/nous.12378
OpenAlexW3173615745
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited33

In this paper, we offer a novel defense of descriptivism about reference. Our argument is based on principles about the relevance of speaker intentions to reference that are shared by many opponents of descriptivism, including Saul Kripke. We first show that two such principles that are plausibly endorsed by Kripke and other prominent externalists in fact entail descriptivism. The first principle states that when certain kinds of speaker intentions are present, they suffice to determine and explain reference. According to the second principle, certain speaker intentions must be present whenever something determines or explains reference. We then go on to make these principles more precise and argue that it would be costly to deny either of them. Since on the more precise understanding we suggest, the conjunction of these principles still entails descriptivism, we conclude that opponents of descriptivism have to give up some highly plausible assumption about the relation between speaker intentions and reference

Argument (complex analysis) · Conjunction (astronomy) · Epistemology · Linguistic description · Linguistics · Physics · Political science · Relation (database) · Relevance (law) · Theoretical linguistics · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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