Z Quanbeck
Biographic Data
| ID | 5911523 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Z Quanbeck |
| GIVEN NAMES | Z |
| FAMILY NAME | Quanbeck |
| SIGNATURE | QUANBECK Z |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5823-1803 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Enticing Epistemic Reasons
Most epistemologists hold that epistemic norms not only forbid believing propositions for which one lacks sufficient evidence, but also sometimes positively require believing propositions for which one has excellent evidence. That is, on the standard view, there are both negative and positive epistemic obligations. Yet proponents of positive epistemic obligations face a serious challenge: Namely, to provide an extensionally adequate, explanatoril…
The Constitutive Inheritance Account of the Ethical Significance of Belief
On the “Isolation Account” of belief’s ethical significance, our beliefs can be noninstrumentally ethically significant independently of their epistemic status and in isolation from other attitudes or actions. However, critics object that fundamental ethical significance should instead be located in nondoxastic attitudes in belief’s vicinity. This article develops an alternative view—the “Constitutive Inheritance Account”—on which our beliefs can…
Doubt, Despair, and Doxastic Agency
Although doubt ( Tvivl ) and despair ( Fortvivlelse ) are widely recognized as two central and closely associated concepts in Kierkegaard’s authorship, their precise relationship remains opaque in the extant interpretive literature. To shed light on their relationship, this paper develops a novel interpretation of Kierkegaard’s understanding of the connection between despair and our agency over our beliefs, and its significance for Kierkegaard’s …
Kierkegaard on belief and credence
Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus famously defines faith as a risky “venture” that requires “holding fast” to “objective uncertainty.” Yet puzzlingly, he emphasizes that faith requires resolute conviction and certainty. Moreover, Climacus claims that all beliefs about contingent propositions about the external world “exclude doubt” and “nullify uncertainty,” but also that uncertainty is “continually present” in these very same beliefs. Th…
Kierkegaard on the Relationship Between Practical and Epistemic Reasons for Belief
On the dominant contemporary accounts of how practical considerations affect what we ought to believe, practical considerations either encroach on epistemic rationality by affecting whether a belief is epistemically justified, or constitute distinctively practical reasons for belief which can only affect what we ought to believe by conflicting with epistemic rationality. This paper argues that Søren Kierkegaard offers a promising alternative view…
Resolving to believe
According to a traditional interpretation of Kierkegaard, he endorses a strong form of direct doxastic voluntarism on which we can, by brute force of will, make a “leap of faith” to believe propositions that we ourselves take to be improbable and absurd. Yet most leading Kierkegaard scholars now wholly reject this reading, instead interpreting Kierkegaard as holding that the will can affect what we believe only indirectly. This paper argues that …
Belief, blame, and inquiry
No prominent works on this page.
Belief, blame, and inquiry
Kierkegaard on belief and credence
Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus famously defines faith as a risky “venture” that requires “holding fast” to “objective uncertainty.” Yet puzzlingly, he emphasizes that faith requires resolute conviction and certainty. Moreover, Climacus claims that all beliefs about contingent propositions about the external world “exclude doubt” and “nullify uncertainty,” but also that uncertainty is “continually present” in these very same beliefs. Th…
Kierkegaard on the Relationship Between Practical and Epistemic Reasons for Belief
On the dominant contemporary accounts of how practical considerations affect what we ought to believe, practical considerations either encroach on epistemic rationality by affecting whether a belief is epistemically justified, or constitute distinctively practical reasons for belief which can only affect what we ought to believe by conflicting with epistemic rationality. This paper argues that Søren Kierkegaard offers a promising alternative view…
Resolving to believe
According to a traditional interpretation of Kierkegaard, he endorses a strong form of direct doxastic voluntarism on which we can, by brute force of will, make a “leap of faith” to believe propositions that we ourselves take to be improbable and absurd. Yet most leading Kierkegaard scholars now wholly reject this reading, instead interpreting Kierkegaard as holding that the will can affect what we believe only indirectly. This paper argues that …
The Constitutive Inheritance Account of the Ethical Significance of Belief
On the “Isolation Account” of belief’s ethical significance, our beliefs can be noninstrumentally ethically significant independently of their epistemic status and in isolation from other attitudes or actions. However, critics object that fundamental ethical significance should instead be located in nondoxastic attitudes in belief’s vicinity. This article develops an alternative view—the “Constitutive Inheritance Account”—on which our beliefs can…
Doubt, Despair, and Doxastic Agency
Although doubt ( Tvivl ) and despair ( Fortvivlelse ) are widely recognized as two central and closely associated concepts in Kierkegaard’s authorship, their precise relationship remains opaque in the extant interpretive literature. To shed light on their relationship, this paper develops a novel interpretation of Kierkegaard’s understanding of the connection between despair and our agency over our beliefs, and its significance for Kierkegaard’s …
Enticing Epistemic Reasons
Most epistemologists hold that epistemic norms not only forbid believing propositions for which one lacks sufficient evidence, but also sometimes positively require believing propositions for which one has excellent evidence. That is, on the standard view, there are both negative and positive epistemic obligations. Yet proponents of positive epistemic obligations face a serious challenge: Namely, to provide an extensionally adequate, explanatoril…
Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Doxastic logic (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Theology and Philosophy of Evil (4 works) · Kierkegaardian Philosophy and Influence (3 works) · Certainty (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Credence (2 works) · Law (2 works)