Enticing Epistemic Reasons

Bibliographic Data

ID22411432
AuthorsZ Quanbeck (0000-0001-5823-1803, Center for Bioethics NYU New York New York USA, corresponding author)
Year2026
Publication date2026-07-13
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueNoûs (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/nous.70054
OpenAlexW7168280364
LanguageEN
References cited79

Most epistemologists hold that epistemic norms not only forbid believing propositions for which one lacks sufficient evidence, but also sometimes positively require believing propositions for which one has excellent evidence. That is, on the standard view, there are both negative and positive epistemic obligations. Yet proponents of positive epistemic obligations face a serious challenge: Namely, to provide an extensionally adequate, explanatorily satisfying account of when positive epistemic obligations are triggered. In light of this challenge, this article defends the claim that there are no positive epistemic obligations by developing a distinctive account of epistemic reasons called the “Enticing Epistemic Reasons View” (EERV). On this view, all epistemic reasons for belief are enticing rather than requiring: They justify believing p and favor believing p , but they do not contribute to making believing p required. Unlike other views rejecting positive epistemic obligations, the EERV both successfully explains why there are no positive epistemic obligations and offers resources to accommodate the intuitive datum that failing to believe practically irrelevant propositions can be criticizable.

Epistemic community · Epistemic virtue · Face (sociological concept) · Philosophy of science · Uncertainty quantification · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory

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