Mario Gómez‐Torrente
Biographic Data
| ID | 5911542 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Mario Gómez‐Torrente |
| GIVEN NAMES | Mario |
| FAMILY NAME | Gómez‐Torrente |
| SIGNATURE | TORRENTE M G |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5957-6544 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 7 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 13 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1997 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Is Kripke’s Meter Sentence A Priori
Marco Ruffino has proposed that Kripke’s meter sentence is a priori because the fact it describes is created in a performative declarative speech act by the stipulator. I criticize the idea that the fact described is created by the stipulator, and go on to criticize also Kripke’s view in unpublished work, that even if his original meter sentence is not a priori, a suitable conditional variation is
Rigidity and necessary application
The question whether the notion of rigidity can be extended in a fruitful way beyond singular terms has received a standard answer in the literature, according to which non‐singular terms designate kinds, properties or other abstract singular objects, and generalized rigidity is the same thing as singular term rigidity, but for terms designating such objects. I offer some new criticisms of this view and go on to defend an alternative view, on whi…
Modal Realism and Anthropic Reasoning
Some arguments against David Lewis’s modal realism seek to exploit apparent inconsistencies between it and anthropic reasoning. A recent argument, in particular, seeks to exploit an inconsistency between modal realism and typicality anthropic premises, premises common in the literature on physical multiverses, to the effect that observers who are like human observers in certain respects must be typical in the relevant multiverse. Here I argue tha…
Précis of Roads to reference
Roads to anti-descriptivism (about reference fixing)
Kripke. Names, Necessity, and Identity
Beyond Rigidity? Essentialist Predication and the Rigidity of General Terms
I offer a brief formal exploration of a certain natural extension of the notion of rigidity to predicates, the notion of an essentialist predicate. I show that, under reasonable assumptions, true "identification sentences" involving essentialist predicates (such as 'Cats are animals') are necessary, and hence that the notion of essentiality is formally analogous in this respect to the notion of singular term rigidity
The Problem of Logical Constants
There have been several different and even opposed conceptions of the problem of logical constants, i.e., of the requirements that a good theory of logical constants ought to satisfy. This paper is in the first place a survey of these conceptions and a critique of the theories they have given rise to. A second aim of the paper is to sketch some ideas about what a good theory would look like. A third aim is to draw from these ideas and from the pr…
Vagueness and Margin for Error Principles
Timothy Williamson's potentially most important contribution to epistemicism about vagueness lies in his arguments for the basic epistemicist claim that the alleged cut‐off points of vague predicates are not knowable. His arguments for this are based on so‐called ‘margin for error principles’. This paper argues that these principles fail to provide a good argument for the basic claim. Williamson has offered at least two kinds of margin for error …
On a fallacy attributed to tarski
The purpose of this paper is to examine some passages of Tarski‘s paper ’On the concept of logical consequence’ and to show that some recent readings of those passages are wrong. John Etchemendy has claimed that in those passages Tarski gave an argument purporting to show that the notion of logical consequence defined by him (as opposed to some pretheoretic notion of logical consequence) possesses certain modal properties. Etchemendy further clai…
Logical Dilemmas
Logical Truth and Tarskian Logical Truth
Manuel García-Carpintero, Las palabras, las ideas y las cosas. Una presentación de la filosofía del lenguaje
Vagueness and Margin for Error Principles
Timothy Williamson's potentially most important contribution to epistemicism about vagueness lies in his arguments for the basic epistemicist claim that the alleged cut‐off points of vague predicates are not knowable. His arguments for this are based on so‐called ‘margin for error principles’. This paper argues that these principles fail to provide a good argument for the basic claim. Williamson has offered at least two kinds of margin for error …
Logical Truth and Tarskian Logical Truth
Manuel García-Carpintero, Las palabras, las ideas y las cosas. Una presentación de la filosofía del lenguaje
On a fallacy attributed to tarski
The purpose of this paper is to examine some passages of Tarski‘s paper ’On the concept of logical consequence’ and to show that some recent readings of those passages are wrong. John Etchemendy has claimed that in those passages Tarski gave an argument purporting to show that the notion of logical consequence defined by him (as opposed to some pretheoretic notion of logical consequence) possesses certain modal properties. Etchemendy further clai…
Logical Dilemmas
Logical Truth and Tarskian Logical Truth
The Problem of Logical Constants
There have been several different and even opposed conceptions of the problem of logical constants, i.e., of the requirements that a good theory of logical constants ought to satisfy. This paper is in the first place a survey of these conceptions and a critique of the theories they have given rise to. A second aim of the paper is to sketch some ideas about what a good theory would look like. A third aim is to draw from these ideas and from the pr…
Vagueness and Margin for Error Principles
Timothy Williamson's potentially most important contribution to epistemicism about vagueness lies in his arguments for the basic epistemicist claim that the alleged cut‐off points of vague predicates are not knowable. His arguments for this are based on so‐called ‘margin for error principles’. This paper argues that these principles fail to provide a good argument for the basic claim. Williamson has offered at least two kinds of margin for error …
Beyond Rigidity? Essentialist Predication and the Rigidity of General Terms
I offer a brief formal exploration of a certain natural extension of the notion of rigidity to predicates, the notion of an essentialist predicate. I show that, under reasonable assumptions, true "identification sentences" involving essentialist predicates (such as 'Cats are animals') are necessary, and hence that the notion of essentiality is formally analogous in this respect to the notion of singular term rigidity
Kripke. Names, Necessity, and Identity
Précis of Roads to reference
Roads to anti-descriptivism (about reference fixing)
Modal Realism and Anthropic Reasoning
Some arguments against David Lewis’s modal realism seek to exploit apparent inconsistencies between it and anthropic reasoning. A recent argument, in particular, seeks to exploit an inconsistency between modal realism and typicality anthropic premises, premises common in the literature on physical multiverses, to the effect that observers who are like human observers in certain respects must be typical in the relevant multiverse. Here I argue tha…
Is Kripke’s Meter Sentence A Priori
Marco Ruffino has proposed that Kripke’s meter sentence is a priori because the fact it describes is created in a performative declarative speech act by the stipulator. I criticize the idea that the fact described is created by the stipulator, and go on to criticize also Kripke’s view in unpublished work, that even if his original meter sentence is not a priori, a suitable conditional variation is
Rigidity and necessary application
The question whether the notion of rigidity can be extended in a fruitful way beyond singular terms has received a standard answer in the literature, according to which non‐singular terms designate kinds, properties or other abstract singular objects, and generalized rigidity is the same thing as singular term rigidity, but for terms designating such objects. I offer some new criticisms of this view and go on to defend an alternative view, on whi…
Philosophy (11 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (10 works) · Epistemology (9 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (5 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Linguistics (4 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works)