Matthew Jope
Biographic Data
| ID | 5911544 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Matthew Jope |
| GIVEN NAMES | Matthew |
| FAMILY NAME | Jope |
| SIGNATURE | JOPE M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Edinburgh |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8898-6358 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Trust, risk, and mere vulnerability
Many philosophers of trust endorse the idea that trust is inherently risky. This raises the question of how exactly we ought to understand the relevant notion of risk. Should we understand it in objectivist or evidentialist terms? I argue that neither of these two ways of unpacking things holds up in light of number of clear examples of trust where there is no associated risk. In view of this failure to make sense of what it could mean for trust …
Closure and the structure of justification
Abstact This paper considers two recent views on the structure of justification and closure of knowledge by Ernest Sosa. It provides reason to believe that neither view is ultimately viable and sketches a better alternative
Trust and Confidence
On the Alleged Instability of Externalist Anti-skepticism
A certain brand of skeptical argument appeals to the thought that our inability to subjectively discriminate between competing hypotheses means that we are unwarranted in believing in either. Externalists respond by pointing out that such arguments depend on an internalist conception of warrant that we would do well to reject. This strategy has been criticized by Crispin Wright, who argues that if we pursue the implications of externalism suffici…
Closure, credence and rationality
Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemic Angst promises a novel solution to the closure-based sceptical problem that, unlike more traditional solutions, does not entail revising our fundamental epistemological commitments. In order to do this, it appeals to a Wittgensteinian account of rational evaluation, the overarching theme of which is that it neither makes sense to doubt nor to believe in our anti-sceptical hinge commitments. The purpose of this paper i…
The symmetry problem for testimonial conservatism
A prima facie plausible and widely held view in epistemology is that the epistemic standards governing the acquisition of testimonial knowledge are stronger than the epistemic standards governing the acquisition of perceptual knowledge. Conservatives about testimony hold that we need prior justification to take speakers to be reliable but recognise that the corresponding claim about perception is practically a non-starter. The problem for conserv…
Closure, credence and rationality
Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemic Angst promises a novel solution to the closure-based sceptical problem that, unlike more traditional solutions, does not entail revising our fundamental epistemological commitments. In order to do this, it appeals to a Wittgensteinian account of rational evaluation, the overarching theme of which is that it neither makes sense to doubt nor to believe in our anti-sceptical hinge commitments. The purpose of this paper i…
On the Alleged Instability of Externalist Anti-skepticism
A certain brand of skeptical argument appeals to the thought that our inability to subjectively discriminate between competing hypotheses means that we are unwarranted in believing in either. Externalists respond by pointing out that such arguments depend on an internalist conception of warrant that we would do well to reject. This strategy has been criticized by Crispin Wright, who argues that if we pursue the implications of externalism suffici…
Closure, credence and rationality
Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemic Angst promises a novel solution to the closure-based sceptical problem that, unlike more traditional solutions, does not entail revising our fundamental epistemological commitments. In order to do this, it appeals to a Wittgensteinian account of rational evaluation, the overarching theme of which is that it neither makes sense to doubt nor to believe in our anti-sceptical hinge commitments. The purpose of this paper i…
The symmetry problem for testimonial conservatism
A prima facie plausible and widely held view in epistemology is that the epistemic standards governing the acquisition of testimonial knowledge are stronger than the epistemic standards governing the acquisition of perceptual knowledge. Conservatives about testimony hold that we need prior justification to take speakers to be reliable but recognise that the corresponding claim about perception is practically a non-starter. The problem for conserv…
Trust and Confidence
Closure and the structure of justification
Abstact This paper considers two recent views on the structure of justification and closure of knowledge by Ernest Sosa. It provides reason to believe that neither view is ultimately viable and sketches a better alternative
Trust, risk, and mere vulnerability
Many philosophers of trust endorse the idea that trust is inherently risky. This raises the question of how exactly we ought to understand the relevant notion of risk. Should we understand it in objectivist or evidentialist terms? I argue that neither of these two ways of unpacking things holds up in light of number of clear examples of trust where there is no associated risk. In view of this failure to make sense of what it could mean for trust …
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Philosophy of language (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (2 works)