Trust, risk, and mere vulnerability
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10347171 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Matthew Jope (0000-0002-8898-6358, Philosophy Department The University of Aberdeen Aberdeen UK, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 111 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 407-422 |
| Publication date | 2025-07-04 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phpr.70040 |
| OpenAlex | W4412027583 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 18 |
Many philosophers of trust endorse the idea that trust is inherently risky. This raises the question of how exactly we ought to understand the relevant notion of risk. Should we understand it in objectivist or evidentialist terms? I argue that neither of these two ways of unpacking things holds up in light of number of clear examples of trust where there is no associated risk. In view of this failure to make sense of what it could mean for trust to inherently involve risk, I propose an alternative account that takes vulnerability, rather than risk, to be necessary for trust. I suggest that philosophers of trust have hitherto failed to be sensitive to this distinction, leading to widespread acceptance of the falsehood that trust essentially entails risk. I provide a range of examples of “mere” vulnerability with no associated risk and then argue that vulnerability is the better notion to help us capture what is essentially involved in placing our trust in others
Business · Computer security · Vulnerability (computing · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
| Highly cited | No |
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