Epistemic Vulnerability
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21604151 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Cara Roure Johnson (0000-0002-1440-4976, University of Idaho, corresponding author), Casey Rebecca Johnson (University of Idaho) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 677-691 |
| Publication date | 2020-10-19 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Journal of Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0967-2559 • E-ISSN: 1466-4542 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09672559.2020.1796030 |
| OpenAlex | W4246687634 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 11 |
In developing her ethics of care, Eva Kittay discusses the vulnerability and voluntarism models of obligation. Kittay uses the vulnerability model to demonstrate that we have some obligations to care, even for those to whom we've made no promise or with whom we have no agreement. Kittay's primary interest is in our moral obligations. I use this distinction to propose a new way to understand our epistemic obligations to one another. After explaining Kittay's models and their epistemic analogs, I use epistemic vulnerability to explain two cases
Epistemology · Moral obligation · Obligation · Political science · Sociology · Voluntarism (philosophy) · Vulnerability (computing) · Computer Science · Ethics in medical practice · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics
A non-ideal aim of redressing epistemic injustices in corruptive educational environments
Our Epistemic Duties in Scenarios of Vaccine Mistrust
I Can('t) Talk About It At Work
Integrating focal vulnerability into trust research
Trust, risk, and mere vulnerability
(In)visibility, Mediated, and Sporting Perceptions
Feeling fixes
| Citations per year | 1.4 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2021 - 2025 (5) |
| Highly cited | No |