Our Epistemic Duties in Scenarios of Vaccine Mistrust
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21604182 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Giulia Terzian (0000-0002-1084-3023, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, corresponding author), María Inés Corbalán (0000-0001-8036-715X) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 29 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 613-640 |
| Publication date | 2021-08-08 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Journal of Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0967-2559 • E-ISSN: 1466-4542 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09672559.2021.1997399 |
| OpenAlex | W4206529965 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 32 |
What, if anything, should we do when someone says they don’t believe in anthropogenic climate change? Or that they worry that a COVID-19 vaccine might be dangerous? We argue that in general, we face an epistemic duty to object to such assertions, qua instances of science denial and science sceptical discourse, respectively. Our argument builds on recent discussions in social epistemology, specifically surrounding the idea that we ought to speak up against (epistemically) problematic assertions so as to fulfil an important epistemic obligation – namely, preventing epistemic harms in others. We show that both science denial (SD) and vaccine hesitant (VH) discourses are harmful in a distinctively epistemic sense, and as such generate an especially strong duty to voice our disagreement. As we also argue, this obligation is nonetheless defeasible: depending on the situational features of those involved, voicing an objection to VH discourse may actually end up doing more harm than good. We conclude by tracing what seems like a promising path towards restoring well-placed public trust in scientific testifiers. Doing so is key in order to guarantee equitable access to warranted beliefs about important subject matters, such as the safety of vaccines, to all segments of society
Defeasible estate · Denial · Duty · Epistemology · Externalism · Harm · Obligation · Political science · Skepticism · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Law · Medicine · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Public Misunderstanding of Science? Reframing the Problem of Vaccine Hesitancy
Denialism
Measuring trust in vaccination
Epistemic Dependence
Covid-19 Related Medical Mistrust, Health Impacts, and Potential Vaccine Hesitancy Among Black Americans Living With HIV
Beyond Tuskegee — Vaccine Distrust and Everyday Racism
Vaccine hesitancy
Epistemic Authority
Epistemic Vulnerability
Believing to Belong
Democracy, Public Policy, and Lay Assessments of Scientific Testimony
Epistemic injustice in healthcare
Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing
Is it appropriate to ‘target’ inappropriate dissent? on the normative consequences of climate skepticism
The Duty to Object
Experts
All for All
You don't trust a government vaccine
Correlates and disparities of intention to vaccinate against Covid-19
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2024 (2) |
| Highly cited | No |