Ann Whittle
Biographic Data
| ID | 5911921 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ann Whittle |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ann |
| FAMILY NAME | Whittle |
| SIGNATURE | WHITTLE A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Manchester |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4193-8911 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
An Analysis of Prospective Responsibilities
In this paper, I offer an analysis of prospective responsibilities. I begin by surveying recent accounts of prospective responsibilities and positioning my view within that literature. Then I offer a more detailed analysis of a shared component of these accounts, namely the claim that S is prospectively responsible for φ only if S has to ‘see to it that φ
Moral Responsibility and Negligence
This paper examines moral responsibility for instances of negligence. It assumes throughout the common-sense claim that we can be morally responsible for cases of negligence, and then looks at the ramifications of this commitment for theories of moral responsibility. Specifically, I argue that instances of negligence pose a problem for two of the most influential theses regarding the nature of moral responsibility. First, negligence poses a probl…
Control and abilities to do otherwise
In this paper, I shall explore the relationship between the control required for action and the control required for moral responsibility. I shall argue that there is an incongruity between Frankfurt’s account of guidance control presented in his theory of action and his commitment to the claim that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility. This inconsistency centres around the role of abilities to do otherwise in our a…
Ceteris Paribus, I Could Have Done Otherwise
In this paper, I explore an alternative to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities for Moral Responsibility—the Ceteris Paribus Principle of Alternative Possibilities for Moral Responsibility. I consider motivations for this principle and answer some objections to it
A Functionalist Theory of Properties
I consider a grand, yet neglected proposal put forward by Shoemaker—a functionalist theory of all properties. I argue that two possible ways of developing this proposal meet with substantial objections. However, if we are prepared to endorse an ontology of tropes, one of these functionalist analyses can be developed into an original and informative theory of properties
A Functionalist Theory of Properties
I consider a grand, yet neglected proposal put forward by Shoemaker—a functionalist theory of all properties. I argue that two possible ways of developing this proposal meet with substantial objections. However, if we are prepared to endorse an ontology of tropes, one of these functionalist analyses can be developed into an original and informative theory of properties
Ceteris Paribus, I Could Have Done Otherwise
In this paper, I explore an alternative to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities for Moral Responsibility—the Ceteris Paribus Principle of Alternative Possibilities for Moral Responsibility. I consider motivations for this principle and answer some objections to it
A Functionalist Theory of Properties
I consider a grand, yet neglected proposal put forward by Shoemaker—a functionalist theory of all properties. I argue that two possible ways of developing this proposal meet with substantial objections. However, if we are prepared to endorse an ontology of tropes, one of these functionalist analyses can be developed into an original and informative theory of properties
Ceteris Paribus, I Could Have Done Otherwise
In this paper, I explore an alternative to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities for Moral Responsibility—the Ceteris Paribus Principle of Alternative Possibilities for Moral Responsibility. I consider motivations for this principle and answer some objections to it
Control and abilities to do otherwise
In this paper, I shall explore the relationship between the control required for action and the control required for moral responsibility. I shall argue that there is an incongruity between Frankfurt’s account of guidance control presented in his theory of action and his commitment to the claim that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility. This inconsistency centres around the role of abilities to do otherwise in our a…
An Analysis of Prospective Responsibilities
In this paper, I offer an analysis of prospective responsibilities. I begin by surveying recent accounts of prospective responsibilities and positioning my view within that literature. Then I offer a more detailed analysis of a shared component of these accounts, namely the claim that S is prospectively responsible for φ only if S has to ‘see to it that φ
Moral Responsibility and Negligence
This paper examines moral responsibility for instances of negligence. It assumes throughout the common-sense claim that we can be morally responsible for cases of negligence, and then looks at the ramifications of this commitment for theories of moral responsibility. Specifically, I argue that instances of negligence pose a problem for two of the most influential theses regarding the nature of moral responsibility. First, negligence poses a probl…
Epistemology (4 works) · Free Will and Agency (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Law and economics (3 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Sociology (2 works) · Action (physics) (1 work) · Advanced Algebra and Logic (1 work) · Analytic philosophy (1 work) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work)