Hayley Clatterbuck
Biographic Data
| ID | 5912208 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Hayley Clatterbuck |
| GIVEN NAMES | Hayley |
| FAMILY NAME | Clatterbuck |
| SIGNATURE | CLATTERBUCK H |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Rochester |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3041-8232 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 7 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Moral Parliament Tool for Allocating Healthcare Resources
The Moral Parliament Tool provides a framework for modeling participants' general moral views and simulating democratic deliberation among them. We show how the tool can be used to support democratic decisions about how to allocate healthcare resources. We apply the tool to three different bioethics case studies, showing how a hypothetical moral parliament composed of delegates of diverse worldviews would decide to distribute resources. This appr…
Navigating Uncertainty about Sentience
Consider the principle that, given two actions A and B, where A affects some number of (merely) possibly sentient individuals (e.g., shrimp) and B affects some number of clearly sentient individuals (e.g., humans), A and B are morally equivalent if their expected values are equivalent. This recently defended principle can have radical implications. This article considers alternatives to this principle that are based on two kinds of risk aversion—…
Learning incommensurate concepts
Hume’s Externalist Gambit
I examine three arguments that purport to show that connectionist, associationist architectures cannot achieve key features of human thought. Hume anticipated each of these three arguments and provided a unified strategy for responding to each, the “externalist gambit.” On this account, external natural language provides the necessary structure for associationist systems to achieve those features of thought that their opponents take them to lack.…
A Defense of Low-Probability Scientific Explanations
I evaluate the plausibility of explanatory elitism, the view that a good scientific explanation of an outcome will show that it was highly probable. I consider an argument from Michael Strevens that elitism is the only view that can account for the historical acceptance of probabilistic theories in physics. I argue that biology provides better test cases for evaluating elitism and conclude that theories in that domain were favored in virtue of co…
Darwin, Hume, Morgan, and the verae causae of psychology
The Logical Problem and the Theoretician's Dilemma
The theory‐theory of human uniqueness posits that the capacity to theorize, in a way strongly analogous to theorizing in scientific practice, was a key innovation in the hominid lineage and was responsible for many of our unique cognitive traits. One of the central arguments that its proponents have used to support the claim that animals are not theorists, the logical problem, bears strong similarities to Hempel's theoretician's dilemma, which pu…
Drift beyond Wright–Fisher
Darwin, Hume, Morgan, and the verae causae of psychology
The Logical Problem and the Theoretician's Dilemma
The theory‐theory of human uniqueness posits that the capacity to theorize, in a way strongly analogous to theorizing in scientific practice, was a key innovation in the hominid lineage and was responsible for many of our unique cognitive traits. One of the central arguments that its proponents have used to support the claim that animals are not theorists, the logical problem, bears strong similarities to Hempel's theoretician's dilemma, which pu…
Drift beyond Wright–Fisher
Learning incommensurate concepts
Drift beyond Wright–Fisher
Darwin, Hume, Morgan, and the verae causae of psychology
The Logical Problem and the Theoretician's Dilemma
The theory‐theory of human uniqueness posits that the capacity to theorize, in a way strongly analogous to theorizing in scientific practice, was a key innovation in the hominid lineage and was responsible for many of our unique cognitive traits. One of the central arguments that its proponents have used to support the claim that animals are not theorists, the logical problem, bears strong similarities to Hempel's theoretician's dilemma, which pu…
A Defense of Low-Probability Scientific Explanations
I evaluate the plausibility of explanatory elitism, the view that a good scientific explanation of an outcome will show that it was highly probable. I consider an argument from Michael Strevens that elitism is the only view that can account for the historical acceptance of probabilistic theories in physics. I argue that biology provides better test cases for evaluating elitism and conclude that theories in that domain were favored in virtue of co…
Hume’s Externalist Gambit
I examine three arguments that purport to show that connectionist, associationist architectures cannot achieve key features of human thought. Hume anticipated each of these three arguments and provided a unified strategy for responding to each, the “externalist gambit.” On this account, external natural language provides the necessary structure for associationist systems to achieve those features of thought that their opponents take them to lack.…
Navigating Uncertainty about Sentience
Consider the principle that, given two actions A and B, where A affects some number of (merely) possibly sentient individuals (e.g., shrimp) and B affects some number of clearly sentient individuals (e.g., humans), A and B are morally equivalent if their expected values are equivalent. This recently defended principle can have radical implications. This article considers alternatives to this principle that are based on two kinds of risk aversion—…
Learning incommensurate concepts
Moral Parliament Tool for Allocating Healthcare Resources
The Moral Parliament Tool provides a framework for modeling participants' general moral views and simulating democratic deliberation among them. We show how the tool can be used to support democratic decisions about how to allocate healthcare resources. We apply the tool to three different bioethics case studies, showing how a hypothetical moral parliament composed of delegates of diverse worldviews would decide to distribute resources. This appr…
Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (4 works) · Child and Animal Learning Development (3 works) · Philosophy of science (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works)