Hume’s Externalist Gambit

Bibliographic Data

ID10705109
AuthorsHayley Clatterbuck (0000-0003-3041-8232, University of Wisconsin–Madison, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume91
Issue5
Pages1296-1305
Publication date2024-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/psa.2023.139
OpenAlexW4387816504
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited13

I examine three arguments that purport to show that connectionist, associationist architectures cannot achieve key features of human thought. Hume anticipated each of these three arguments and provided a unified strategy for responding to each, the “externalist gambit.” On this account, external natural language provides the necessary structure for associationist systems to achieve those features of thought that their opponents take them to lack. The externalist gambit provides a promising avenue for today’s defenders of connectionism about the human mind

Artificial neural network · Cognitive science · Connectionism · Epistemology · Externalism · Gambit · Internalism and externalism · Key (lock) · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

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