Timothy J Goodspeed
Biographic Data
| ID | 5918233 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Timothy J Goodspeed |
| GIVEN NAMES | Timothy J |
| FAMILY NAME | Goodspeed |
| SIGNATURE | GOODSPEED T J |
| AFFILIATIONS | City University of New York |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5983-6078 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 18 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Coping with extreme events
Extreme events create both macroeconomic and budgetary problems for decentralised governments. Decentralised governments are unequipped for macroeconomic stabilisation policies and have very limited fiscal space. At a practical level there are three options to replace lost funding from an extreme event: decentralised governments can anticipate and save for these budgetary rainy days themselves, they can issue debt, or the central government can s…
Decentralization and intra-country transfers in the Great Recession
Empirical evidence is found supporting the assignment of the redistribution function to the central government. Viewing the Great Recession, or recessions in general, as a shock, it is found that after the shock, more decentralized economies show a more negative response of subnational government social protection expenditures than more centralized ones. Results for the vertical fiscal imbalance are consistent with the theory of soft budget const…
Absorbing Shocks
In this paper we investigate the interplay between national rainy-day funds and supranational transfers in a fiscal union. We find that moral hazard leads to lower contributions to a rainy day fund with a fiscal union present, and further that the higher the fiscal transfer, the lower will be the contributions to the rainy-day fund. The optimal size of the fiscal union trades-off the ex-post insurance provided by the union and the moral hazard wh…
Public Policies and FDI Location
This paper examines the impact of three host country government policies (taxation, good governance, and infrastructure) on the host's FDI stock. We focus on whether the impact of these factors differs depending on the level of development of the host country. The regression results indicate that FDI is sensitive to host country taxation in developed countries, but not in developing countries; FDI is sensitive to host country governance measures …
Political fragmentation, party ideology and public expenditures
Political fragmentation, party ideology and public expenditures
Decentralization and intra-country transfers in the Great Recession
Empirical evidence is found supporting the assignment of the redistribution function to the central government. Viewing the Great Recession, or recessions in general, as a shock, it is found that after the shock, more decentralized economies show a more negative response of subnational government social protection expenditures than more centralized ones. Results for the vertical fiscal imbalance are consistent with the theory of soft budget const…
Coping with extreme events
Extreme events create both macroeconomic and budgetary problems for decentralised governments. Decentralised governments are unequipped for macroeconomic stabilisation policies and have very limited fiscal space. At a practical level there are three options to replace lost funding from an extreme event: decentralised governments can anticipate and save for these budgetary rainy days themselves, they can issue debt, or the central government can s…
Public Policies and FDI Location
This paper examines the impact of three host country government policies (taxation, good governance, and infrastructure) on the host's FDI stock. We focus on whether the impact of these factors differs depending on the level of development of the host country. The regression results indicate that FDI is sensitive to host country taxation in developed countries, but not in developing countries; FDI is sensitive to host country governance measures …
Political fragmentation, party ideology and public expenditures
Absorbing Shocks
In this paper we investigate the interplay between national rainy-day funds and supranational transfers in a fiscal union. We find that moral hazard leads to lower contributions to a rainy day fund with a fiscal union present, and further that the higher the fiscal transfer, the lower will be the contributions to the rainy-day fund. The optimal size of the fiscal union trades-off the ex-post insurance provided by the union and the moral hazard wh…
Decentralization and intra-country transfers in the Great Recession
Empirical evidence is found supporting the assignment of the redistribution function to the central government. Viewing the Great Recession, or recessions in general, as a shock, it is found that after the shock, more decentralized economies show a more negative response of subnational government social protection expenditures than more centralized ones. Results for the vertical fiscal imbalance are consistent with the theory of soft budget const…
Coping with extreme events
Extreme events create both macroeconomic and budgetary problems for decentralised governments. Decentralised governments are unequipped for macroeconomic stabilisation policies and have very limited fiscal space. At a practical level there are three options to replace lost funding from an extreme event: decentralised governments can anticipate and save for these budgetary rainy days themselves, they can issue debt, or the central government can s…
Economics (5 works) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (4 works) · Local Government Finance and Decentralization (4 works) · Macroeconomics (4 works) · Economic policy (3 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Corporate governance (2 works) · Decentralization (2 works) · Development economics (2 works)