Decentralization and intra-country transfers in the Great Recession

The case of the European Union

Bibliographic Data

ID10406346
AuthorsTimothy J Goodspeed (0000-0002-5983-6078, City University of New York, corresponding author)
Year2019
Volume54
Issue7
Pages931-941
Publication date2019-10-14
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueRegional Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0034-3404 • E-ISSN: 1360-0591
PublisherRoutledge (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00343404.2019.1666207
OpenAlexW2980907836
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited33

Empirical evidence is found supporting the assignment of the redistribution function to the central government. Viewing the Great Recession, or recessions in general, as a shock, it is found that after the shock, more decentralized economies show a more negative response of subnational government social protection expenditures than more centralized ones. Results for the vertical fiscal imbalance are consistent with the theory of soft budget constraints: economies with a greater vertical fiscal imbalance show larger increases in subnational government social protection expenditures after the shock and greater prior subnational government borrowing. Caution should be used in extending the argument to the European Union level

Argument (complex analysis · Budget constraint · Decentralization · Development economics · Economic policy · Economics · Empirical evidence · European union · Government (linguistics · Government spending · International economics · Macroeconomics · Market economy · Political science · Recession · Redistribution (election · Shock (circulatory · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Local Government Finance and Decentralization

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