Winand Emons
Biographic Data
| ID | 5928802 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Winand Emons |
| GIVEN NAMES | Winand |
| FAMILY NAME | Emons |
| SIGNATURE | EMONS W |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Bern |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0649-0704 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Symposium on Credence Goods
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony
Un arbitre doit décider d’un litige entre deux parties dans le cadre d’une procédure purement accusatoire. Sa décision peut reposer uniquement sur ses a priori, en l’absence d’information supplémentaire ; ou bien elle peut reposer sur les éléments de preuve additionnels soumis volontairement par les parties au litige. Lorsqu’elle décide de témoigner, et moyennant un coût, chaque partie peut déformer la réalité en sa faveur. À l’équilibre, les par…
Incentive-Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians
Physicians choose capacity before demand materializes; actual demand may be higher or lower than capacity. If a physician's capacity exceeds demand, she may have an incentive to overtreat, i.e., she may provide unnecessary treatments to use up idle capacity. By contrast, with excess demand she may undertreat, i.e., she may not provide necessary treatments because other activities are financially more attractive. We first show that simple fee-for-…
Perjury versus Truth Revelation
Witnesses often gain by slanting testimony. Courts try to elicit the truth with perjury rules. Perjury is not truth-revealing; truth revelation is, however, possible. With a truth-revealing mechanism the judge will get little testimony because the defendant will not present witnesses with unfavorable news; yet the testimony is of high quality. Under perjury the court gets a different amount of testimony with lower informational content. A court s…
Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts
In trials witnesses often slant their testimony in order to advance their own interests. To obtain truthful testimony, the law relies on cross-examination under threat of prosecution for perjury. We show that perjury law is an imperfect truthrevealing mechanism. Moreover, we develop a truth-revealing mechanism for the same set of restrictions under which perjury rules operate. Under this mechanism the witness is sanctioned if a court eventually f…
Informational Externalities, Herding, and Incentives
Informational Externalities, Herding, and Incentives
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Informational Externalities, Herding, and Incentives
Informational Externalities, Herding, and Incentives
Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts
In trials witnesses often slant their testimony in order to advance their own interests. To obtain truthful testimony, the law relies on cross-examination under threat of prosecution for perjury. We show that perjury law is an imperfect truthrevealing mechanism. Moreover, we develop a truth-revealing mechanism for the same set of restrictions under which perjury rules operate. Under this mechanism the witness is sanctioned if a court eventually f…
Perjury versus Truth Revelation
Witnesses often gain by slanting testimony. Courts try to elicit the truth with perjury rules. Perjury is not truth-revealing; truth revelation is, however, possible. With a truth-revealing mechanism the judge will get little testimony because the defendant will not present witnesses with unfavorable news; yet the testimony is of high quality. Under perjury the court gets a different amount of testimony with lower informational content. A court s…
Incentive-Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians
Physicians choose capacity before demand materializes; actual demand may be higher or lower than capacity. If a physician's capacity exceeds demand, she may have an incentive to overtreat, i.e., she may provide unnecessary treatments to use up idle capacity. By contrast, with excess demand she may undertreat, i.e., she may not provide necessary treatments because other activities are financially more attractive. We first show that simple fee-for-…
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony
Un arbitre doit décider d’un litige entre deux parties dans le cadre d’une procédure purement accusatoire. Sa décision peut reposer uniquement sur ses a priori, en l’absence d’information supplémentaire ; ou bien elle peut reposer sur les éléments de preuve additionnels soumis volontairement par les parties au litige. Lorsqu’elle décide de témoigner, et moyennant un coût, chaque partie peut déformer la réalité en sa faveur. À l’équilibre, les par…
Symposium on Credence Goods
Political science (4 works) · Business (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (3 works) · Legal and Constitutional Studies (3 works) · Incentive (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Actuarial science (1 work)