Chulyoung Kim
Biographic Data
| ID | 5935284 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Chulyoung Kim |
| GIVEN NAMES | Chulyoung |
| FAMILY NAME | Kim |
| SIGNATURE | KIM C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Yonsei University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8921-3288 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
An Experimental Study of Auctions with Externalities
This paper theoretically and experimentally studies first-price and second-price auctions in a complete information setting where one bidder creates a positive or negative externality on the other two bidders. The two bidders subject to externalities can be considered as playing coordination and anti-coordination games under positive and negative externalities, respectively, and the issues of coordination failure and free riding arise. Our experi…
Strategic alliances in a veto game: An experimental study
Exoneree Compensation and Endogenous Plea Bargaining: Theory and Experiment
We study how plea-bargaining behaviors may respond to a change in two important policy variables in criminal law: the level of exoneree compensation and the accuracy of the exoneration process. Confirming the theoretical predictions, we experimentally find that prosecutor subjects make more lenient plea-bargaining offers in response to higher exoneree compensation, and less lenient offers in response to higher exoneration accuracy. We also find t…
Endowment Effects in Proposal Rights Contests
We experimentally investigate a two-stage game where players compete to be recognized as a proposer in the first stage and play an ultimatum bargaining game in the second stage. We introduce a treatment regarding whether one of the subjects is framed to have proposal rights (without any material advantage) in the beginning of the game. We found that subjects who were framed to be »incumbents« spent significantly more resources to keep their propo…
Centralized versus Decentralized Institutions for Expert Testimony
The legal community has been debating the question of who should select and provide expert witnesses at trial: the litigant or the judge? Using a persuasiongame framework, I show that there is a trade-off. On one hand, the litigant may consult an expert even when the judge is reluctant to do so due to high costs. On the other hand, given the same amount of expert advice, the judge can make a more accurate decision when using her own expert's advi…
An economic rationale for dismissing low‐quality experts in trial
The history of the admissibility standard for expert testimony in American courtrooms reveals that the standard has gradually increased to a high level following a series of important decisions by the Supreme Court. Whether such a stringent standard for expert testimony is beneficial or detrimental to the American justice system is still under fierce debate, but there has been scant economic analysis of this issue. This paper attempts to fill the…
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Centralized versus Decentralized Institutions for Expert Testimony
The legal community has been debating the question of who should select and provide expert witnesses at trial: the litigant or the judge? Using a persuasiongame framework, I show that there is a trade-off. On one hand, the litigant may consult an expert even when the judge is reluctant to do so due to high costs. On the other hand, given the same amount of expert advice, the judge can make a more accurate decision when using her own expert's advi…
An economic rationale for dismissing low‐quality experts in trial
The history of the admissibility standard for expert testimony in American courtrooms reveals that the standard has gradually increased to a high level following a series of important decisions by the Supreme Court. Whether such a stringent standard for expert testimony is beneficial or detrimental to the American justice system is still under fierce debate, but there has been scant economic analysis of this issue. This paper attempts to fill the…
Exoneree Compensation and Endogenous Plea Bargaining: Theory and Experiment
We study how plea-bargaining behaviors may respond to a change in two important policy variables in criminal law: the level of exoneree compensation and the accuracy of the exoneration process. Confirming the theoretical predictions, we experimentally find that prosecutor subjects make more lenient plea-bargaining offers in response to higher exoneree compensation, and less lenient offers in response to higher exoneration accuracy. We also find t…
Endowment Effects in Proposal Rights Contests
We experimentally investigate a two-stage game where players compete to be recognized as a proposer in the first stage and play an ultimatum bargaining game in the second stage. We introduce a treatment regarding whether one of the subjects is framed to have proposal rights (without any material advantage) in the beginning of the game. We found that subjects who were framed to be »incumbents« spent significantly more resources to keep their propo…
Strategic alliances in a veto game: An experimental study
An Experimental Study of Auctions with Externalities
This paper theoretically and experimentally studies first-price and second-price auctions in a complete information setting where one bidder creates a positive or negative externality on the other two bidders. The two bidders subject to externalities can be considered as playing coordination and anti-coordination games under positive and negative externalities, respectively, and the issues of coordination failure and free riding arise. Our experi…
Economics (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (4 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Law and economics (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 works)