Endowment Effects in Proposal Rights Contests
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 24040262 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Youjin Hahn (0000-0002-2043-6157), Chulyoung Kim (0000-0001-8921-3288), Sang-Hyun Kim (0000-0001-7290-797X), Sang-Hyun Kim Sang-Hyun Kim (0000-0001-6171-5382) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 177 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 449-476 |
| Publication date | 2021-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0932-4569 • E-ISSN: 1614-0559 |
| Publisher | Mohr Siebeck (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1628/jite-2021-0018 |
| OpenAlex | W3211742115 |
| Language | EN |
We experimentally investigate a two-stage game where players compete to be recognized as a proposer in the first stage and play an ultimatum bargaining game in the second stage. We introduce a treatment regarding whether one of the subjects is framed to have proposal rights (without any material advantage) in the beginning of the game. We found that subjects who were framed to be »incumbents« spent significantly more resources to keep their proposal rights than others. We also present and analyze additional behavioral patterns observed in our proposal rights contest experiment.
Economics · Endowment · Political science · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |