Luciano Fanti
Biographic Data
| ID | 5935624 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Luciano Fanti |
| GIVEN NAMES | Luciano |
| FAMILY NAME | Fanti |
| SIGNATURE | FANTI L |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Pisa |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4944-8370 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 16 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 11 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 16 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Centralised or decentralised unions? Welfare effects of wage-aggressiveness
The co-determination decision game with consumption externalities
This work aims to investigate the effects of co-determination in a game-theoretic setting by considering network externalities in consumption. The received theoretical literature, so far focused only on standard (non-network) industries, showed that co-determination might emerge as the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of a non-cooperative Cournot duopoly, but this outcome generates a prisoner’s dilemma. The present research shows that (po…
Competitive wages and tax evasion in a Cournot duopoly
In a Cournot duopoly with indirect tax evasion, this paper counter-intuitively shows that, in the presence of positive competitive wages, a higher indirect taxation may increase expected profits. This result is likely to occur if the market size (or alternatively, if the cost pressure exerted by wages) is adequately large and the detection probability is not too high, and it is equivalent irrespective of firms optimally choosing either the tax ba…
Environmental delegation versus sales delegation
Recently, in their 2019 paper, Poyago-Theotoky and Yong consider a managerial Cournot duopoly with pollution externalities and emission taxes and propose an explicit environmental incentive in a managerial compensation contract. The authors compare several exogenous equilibria emerging in the symmetric sub-games in which the owner offers either the environmental delegation contract or the standard sales delegation contract: abatement and social w…
The disclosure decision game
This article presents a three-stage non-cooperative disclosure decision game (DDG), in which R&D-investing firms choose whether to disclose R&D-related information to the rival in a Cournot-like environment. Though firms have no (private) incentive to disclose information unilaterally on their cost-reducing R&D activity to prevent a rival from engaging in free appropriation, this work reveals opportunity for the government to design an optimal po…
‘Green’ managerial delegation theory
This article develops a non-cooperative game with managerial quantity-setting firms in which owners choose whether to delegate output and abatement decisions to managers through a contract based on emissions (conventionally denoted as ‘green’ delegation, GD) instead of sales (sales delegation, SD), and the government levies an emissions tax to incentivise firms’ emissions-reduction actions. First, it compares the Nash equilibrium outcomes between…
Managerial firms’ profitability, unions, and environmental taxes
This article examines how determining an optimal environmental tax in a Cournot duopoly with unionized labour markets and managerial firms departing from the strict profit‐maximization. It is shown that firm‐specific monopoly unions that set wages (1) reduce both the environmental tax and environmental damage and (2) counterintuitively, increase firms’ profitability when the abatement technology is not too “efficient”, and the public evaluation o…
Optimal Share of Privatisation in a Public Monopoly with Unionised Workers
In a monopoly industry with firm-union wage bargaining, we show that it is optimal to privatise a share of the public firm. The optimal privatisation share increases with the union's higher bargaining power and/or wage-orientation and, when the latter is large, full privatisation becomes socially optimal. Interestingly, the optimal privatisation share is the highest (lowest) when the government attributes a medium-low (low and high) weight to the…
Do labour union recognition and bargaining deter entry in a network industry? A sequential game model
An Observable Delay Game with Unionised Managerial Firms
The endogenous order of moves is analysed in a unionised Cournot duopoly with managerial delegation and firm‐specific unions, where firms choose whether to set quantities sequentially or simultaneously. It is shown that, in contrast to the standard duopoly with profit‐maximising firms where both firms prefer to be the leader and thus simultaneously chosen quantities emerge as an endogenous equilibrium, a rich set of equilibrium outcomes may occur…
Endogenous fertility, endogenous lifetime and economic growth
Fertility-related pensions and cyclical instability
Endogenous Lifetime in an Overlapping-Generations Small Open Economy
Using an overlapping-generations small open economy with endogenous lifetime ` a la Chakraborty (2004), we show that an increase in public investments in health is beneficial to life expectancy but can actually reduce both saving and domestic income per worker. Moreover, using the notion of A -efficiency introduced by Golosov et al. (2007) in a context of endogenous population (i.e., Pareto efficiency applied to people alive in every state), whic…
Aints
This paper compares two alternative incentive schemes, performance-related pay (PRP) and relative performance evaluation (RPE), in a differentiated duopoly where institutional features constrain firms to pay workers a given salary. It is shown that RPE endogenously arises as the optimal choice by firms and outperforms PRP as regards overall output, profits, and social welfare. This holds true irrespective of the degree of product substitutability…
Neoclassical growth with endogenous age distribution. Poverty vs low-fertility traps as steady states of demographic transitions
Fertility and Payg pensions in the overlapping generations model
Fertility and Payg pensions in the overlapping generations model
Fertility-related pensions and cyclical instability
Managerial firms’ profitability, unions, and environmental taxes
This article examines how determining an optimal environmental tax in a Cournot duopoly with unionized labour markets and managerial firms departing from the strict profit‐maximization. It is shown that firm‐specific monopoly unions that set wages (1) reduce both the environmental tax and environmental damage and (2) counterintuitively, increase firms’ profitability when the abatement technology is not too “efficient”, and the public evaluation o…
Neoclassical growth with endogenous age distribution. Poverty vs low-fertility traps as steady states of demographic transitions
Fertility and Payg pensions in the overlapping generations model
Endogenous Lifetime in an Overlapping-Generations Small Open Economy
Using an overlapping-generations small open economy with endogenous lifetime ` a la Chakraborty (2004), we show that an increase in public investments in health is beneficial to life expectancy but can actually reduce both saving and domestic income per worker. Moreover, using the notion of A -efficiency introduced by Golosov et al. (2007) in a context of endogenous population (i.e., Pareto efficiency applied to people alive in every state), whic…
Aints
This paper compares two alternative incentive schemes, performance-related pay (PRP) and relative performance evaluation (RPE), in a differentiated duopoly where institutional features constrain firms to pay workers a given salary. It is shown that RPE endogenously arises as the optimal choice by firms and outperforms PRP as regards overall output, profits, and social welfare. This holds true irrespective of the degree of product substitutability…
Neoclassical growth with endogenous age distribution. Poverty vs low-fertility traps as steady states of demographic transitions
Endogenous fertility, endogenous lifetime and economic growth
Fertility-related pensions and cyclical instability
An Observable Delay Game with Unionised Managerial Firms
The endogenous order of moves is analysed in a unionised Cournot duopoly with managerial delegation and firm‐specific unions, where firms choose whether to set quantities sequentially or simultaneously. It is shown that, in contrast to the standard duopoly with profit‐maximising firms where both firms prefer to be the leader and thus simultaneously chosen quantities emerge as an endogenous equilibrium, a rich set of equilibrium outcomes may occur…
Do labour union recognition and bargaining deter entry in a network industry? A sequential game model
Optimal Share of Privatisation in a Public Monopoly with Unionised Workers
In a monopoly industry with firm-union wage bargaining, we show that it is optimal to privatise a share of the public firm. The optimal privatisation share increases with the union's higher bargaining power and/or wage-orientation and, when the latter is large, full privatisation becomes socially optimal. Interestingly, the optimal privatisation share is the highest (lowest) when the government attributes a medium-low (low and high) weight to the…
‘Green’ managerial delegation theory
This article develops a non-cooperative game with managerial quantity-setting firms in which owners choose whether to delegate output and abatement decisions to managers through a contract based on emissions (conventionally denoted as ‘green’ delegation, GD) instead of sales (sales delegation, SD), and the government levies an emissions tax to incentivise firms’ emissions-reduction actions. First, it compares the Nash equilibrium outcomes between…
Managerial firms’ profitability, unions, and environmental taxes
This article examines how determining an optimal environmental tax in a Cournot duopoly with unionized labour markets and managerial firms departing from the strict profit‐maximization. It is shown that firm‐specific monopoly unions that set wages (1) reduce both the environmental tax and environmental damage and (2) counterintuitively, increase firms’ profitability when the abatement technology is not too “efficient”, and the public evaluation o…
Environmental delegation versus sales delegation
Recently, in their 2019 paper, Poyago-Theotoky and Yong consider a managerial Cournot duopoly with pollution externalities and emission taxes and propose an explicit environmental incentive in a managerial compensation contract. The authors compare several exogenous equilibria emerging in the symmetric sub-games in which the owner offers either the environmental delegation contract or the standard sales delegation contract: abatement and social w…
The disclosure decision game
This article presents a three-stage non-cooperative disclosure decision game (DDG), in which R&D-investing firms choose whether to disclose R&D-related information to the rival in a Cournot-like environment. Though firms have no (private) incentive to disclose information unilaterally on their cost-reducing R&D activity to prevent a rival from engaging in free appropriation, this work reveals opportunity for the government to design an optimal po…
The co-determination decision game with consumption externalities
This work aims to investigate the effects of co-determination in a game-theoretic setting by considering network externalities in consumption. The received theoretical literature, so far focused only on standard (non-network) industries, showed that co-determination might emerge as the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of a non-cooperative Cournot duopoly, but this outcome generates a prisoner’s dilemma. The present research shows that (po…
Competitive wages and tax evasion in a Cournot duopoly
In a Cournot duopoly with indirect tax evasion, this paper counter-intuitively shows that, in the presence of positive competitive wages, a higher indirect taxation may increase expected profits. This result is likely to occur if the market size (or alternatively, if the cost pressure exerted by wages) is adequately large and the detection probability is not too high, and it is equivalent irrespective of firms optimally choosing either the tax ba…
Centralised or decentralised unions? Welfare effects of wage-aggressiveness
Economics (15 works) · Microeconomics (13 works) · Merger and Competition Analysis (9 works) · Cournot competition (7 works) · Labour economics (7 works) · Duopoly (6 works) · Business (5 works) · Overlapping generations model (5 works) · Welfare (5 works) · Climate Change Policy and Economics (4 works)