Managerial firms’ profitability, unions, and environmental taxes
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12615461 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Domenico Buccella (0000-0002-9594-0630, Department of Economics Kozminski University Jagiellońska Street, 57/59 Warsaw 03301 Poland, corresponding author), Luciano Fanti (0000-0002-4944-8370, Department of Economics and Management University of Pisa Via Cosimo Ridolfi, 10 Pisa (PI) I–56124 Italy), Luca Gori (0000-0003-1967-0840, Department of Law University of Pisa Via Collegio Ricci, 10 Pisa (PI), and GLO I–56126 Italy) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 94 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 575-598 |
| Publication date | 2022-09-08 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1370-4788 • E-ISSN: 1467-8292 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/apce.12391 |
| OpenAlex | W4296104638 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 35 |
This article examines how determining an optimal environmental tax in a Cournot duopoly with unionized labour markets and managerial firms departing from the strict profit‐maximization. It is shown that firm‐specific monopoly unions that set wages (1) reduce both the environmental tax and environmental damage and (2) counterintuitively, increase firms’ profitability when the abatement technology is not too “efficient”, and the public evaluation of environmental quality is sufficiently high. Within this framework, the work also develops the endogenous game played by firms that must choose between sales delegation (SD) and profit‐maximization. Results show that the SD contract always emerges as the unique, deadlock sub‐game perfect Nash equilibrium, thereby solving the (prisoner's) dilemma emerging in the related existing literature assuming a competitive labour market
Cournot competition · Delegation · Dilemma · Duopoly · Economics · Industrial organization · Maximization · Microeconomics · Monopoly · Nash equilibrium · Oligopoly · Profit (economics · Profit maximization · Profitability index · Stackelberg competition · Climate Change Policy and Economics · Energy, Environment, and Transportation Policies · Merger and Competition Analysis · Finance
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |