Delegation and the Theory of the Firm
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9703615 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John Vickers (0000-0003-3962-4323, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1985 |
| Volume | 95 |
| Pages | 138 |
| Publication date | 1985-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2232877 |
| OpenAlex | W4240963077 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 52 |
Journal Article Delegation and the Theory of the Firm Get access John Vickers John Vickers Nuffield College, Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 95, Issue Supplement, 1 December 1985, Pages 138–147, https://doi.org/10.2307/2232877 Published: 01 December 1985
Delegation · Economics · Law and economics · Management · Neoclassical economics · Political science · Theory of the firm · Business Strategy and Innovation · Corporate Finance and Governance · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance
Delegation, Risk, and Project Scope
Cross-ownership and strategic environmental corporate social responsibility under price competition
Nash versus consistent equilibrium
Social desirability of entry in a bilateral oligopoly—The implications of (non) sunk costs
Organizational form and excess burden of taxation in a multiproduct mixed oligopoly
Strategic Location and Manager Delegation with Concentrated Consumer Demand
‘Green’ managerial delegation theory
Environmental delegation versus sales delegation
Nash Equilibria with Incomplete Preferences
Brand loyalty, managerial delegation and position choices
Cooperation in a differentiated duopoly when information is dispersed
Centralised or decentralised unions? Welfare effects of wage-aggressiveness
The co-determination decision game with consumption externalities
Optimal Share of Privatisation in a Public Monopoly with Unionised Workers
Pass‐Through and Tax Incidence in Differentiated Mixed Duopoly With Managerial Delegation
Delegating Relational Contracts to Corruptible Intermediaries
Delegation effects in representative democracies
Retail Contracting
Commitment in alternating offers bargaining
Comparative statics for aggregative games the strong concavity case
Managerial Incentives and Heterogeneous Firms
Strategic Reason for Employing Workers with Public Service Motivation
Delegation study in asymmetric game
Drastic innovation reduces firms’ incentives to create divisions
Ceo Activism and Supply Chain Interactions
Managerial firms’ profitability, unions, and environmental taxes
Strategic delegation under spatial price discrimination
Share tenancy as strategic delegation
Executive compensation and competitive pressure in the product market
Strategic incentives for keeping one set of books under the Arm’s Length Principle
Vertical product differentiation, managerial delegation and social welfare in a vertically-related market
Managerial incentives and endogenous coalition formation with externalities
On the competitive effects of divisionalization
Cournot vs. Bertrand under relative performance delegation
Estrutura de propriedade e eficiência
When groups contribute to a public good
An Observable Delay Game with Unionised Managerial Firms
Workers' Enterprises and the Taste for Production
Biased managers with network externalities
A biased firm in a market with complementary products. A note on the welfare effects
Mutual Outsourcing in an Equilibrium Vertical Structure
The welfare effect of release timing of relative performance evaluation under quantity competition and asymmetric costs
Non‐linear revenue evaluation
Taxe environnementale et incitations managériales dans un duopole mixte
Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives
Partitioned Pricing and Collusion on Surcharges
Collusion and Organization Design
Vertical Separation with Private Contracts
The Welfare Effects of Tax Competition Reconsidered
Choosing Agents and Monitoring Consumption
Delegating Away Democracy
The Political Economy of Inappropriate Technology
| Citations per year | 1.63 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1994 - 2026 (33) |
| Highly cited | No |