Pass‐Through and Tax Incidence in Differentiated Mixed Duopoly With Managerial Delegation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21287542 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Di Wu (0000-0002-1269-4260, School of Economics Nankai University Tianjin China), Leonard F S Wang (0000-0001-5202-2867, Asia Pacific Research Foundation Kaohsiung Taiwan, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 84 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 865-876 |
| Publication date | 2025-06-05 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Economics and Sociology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0002-9246 • E-ISSN: 1536-7150 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ajes.12639 |
| OpenAlex | W4411105243 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 36 |
This article explores how managerial delegation affects pass‐through and tax incidence in a mixed Cournot duopoly. It finds that the delegation coefficient of the private firm's manager is positive, while the coefficient of public firm's manager is negative. Sales delegation tends to increase pass‐through rates and amplifies tax incidence. Comparing with the scenarios where a single firm hires a manager, both public and private firms hiring managers will generate the highest pass‐through rates and the incidence of ad valorem tax, while the incidence of specific tax is the lowest
Business · Cournot competition · Delegation · Duopoly · Economics · Industrial organization · Management · Microeconomics · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance · Digital Platforms and Economics · Merger and Competition Analysis
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |