Leonard F S Wang
Biographic Data
| ID | 710706 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Leonard F S Wang |
| GIVEN NAMES | Leonard F S |
| FAMILY NAME | Wang |
| SIGNATURE | WANG L F S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Zhongnan University of Economics and Law |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5202-2867 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1989 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Positive Network Externalities and Negative Environmental Externalities in a Differentiated Duopoly With Entry Fee‐Refund Policy
Most of the studies on the implications of externalities rarely consider the coexistence of positive network externalities and negative externalities. This paper examines the effect of net externalities in price competition and the effectiveness of the entry fee‐refund policy. We show that the positive network externalities improve profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare, while negative externalities reduce them. The implementation of an en…
Pass‐Through and Tax Incidence in Differentiated Mixed Duopoly With Managerial Delegation
This article explores how managerial delegation affects pass‐through and tax incidence in a mixed Cournot duopoly. It finds that the delegation coefficient of the private firm's manager is positive, while the coefficient of public firm's manager is negative. Sales delegation tends to increase pass‐through rates and amplifies tax incidence. Comparing with the scenarios where a single firm hires a manager, both public and private firms hiring manag…
Privatization Neutrality Theorem in Free Entry Markets With Efficiency Gap
This paper explores the effects of privatization and subsidization policies in a mixed oligopoly, consisting of one semipublic firm and multiple private firms, where partial privatization affects technological disparity. The analysis shows that privatization can be either insufficient or excessive in reducing the efficiency gap, depending on market structure (restricted or free entry) and available policy tools. In cases of free entry with a comb…
Technology Licensing Versus Cannibalization, and Consumers' Welfare in Vertical Product Quality Market
This paper investigates the strategy choice of a high‐quality firm confronted with the entry of a low‐quality competitor in vertical product‐quality difference markets. We find that due to asymmetric market power, the high‐quality firm may prefer quality licensing over cannibalization as its optimal strategy. Fixed‐fee licensing contract has the potential to enhance consumer surplus and boost the profits of both firms, making it a potentially opt…
Specific vs. ad valorem taxation and social welfare in mixed duopoly with foreign ownership
In this paper, we set up a mixed duopoly competition model between state-owned and private firms in order to compare specific and ad valorem taxes. Assuming that the total output under specific and ad valorem taxation remains unchanged, we find that if the public firm is completely privatised, the output of the private firm under the two tax schemes will be the same. If the public firm is not completely privatised, the output of the the private f…
Network externalities in a vertically differentiated luxury goods market
Upstream SOEs in the mixed-ownership reform
This article explores possible options of the upstream mixed-ownership reform with imperfect substitute products in a vertically related market composed of one upstream SOE and two downstream profit-maximising retailers. Its focus is not only on incorporating the issue of privatisation into a vertical market structure, but also on extending the traditional upstream–downstream competition model by allowing the active contribution of retailers to e…
Vertical product differentiation, managerial delegation and social welfare in a vertically-related market
Optimal Privatization and Subsidization Policies in a Mixed Duopoly
This study considers subsidization and privatization policies in a mixed duopoly with one public firm and one private firm. The special feature of this study is that privatization can reduce the cost gap between the firms. We show that the optimal subsidy yields the efficient production allocation if privatization is not implemented. However, once the public firm is privatized, it overproduces under the optimal subsidy. Moreover, partial privatiz…
Resource policy, investment, and employment under variable returns to scale
Resource policy, investment, and employment under variable returns to scale
Optimal Privatization and Subsidization Policies in a Mixed Duopoly
This study considers subsidization and privatization policies in a mixed duopoly with one public firm and one private firm. The special feature of this study is that privatization can reduce the cost gap between the firms. We show that the optimal subsidy yields the efficient production allocation if privatization is not implemented. However, once the public firm is privatized, it overproduces under the optimal subsidy. Moreover, partial privatiz…
Vertical product differentiation, managerial delegation and social welfare in a vertically-related market
Upstream SOEs in the mixed-ownership reform
This article explores possible options of the upstream mixed-ownership reform with imperfect substitute products in a vertically related market composed of one upstream SOE and two downstream profit-maximising retailers. Its focus is not only on incorporating the issue of privatisation into a vertical market structure, but also on extending the traditional upstream–downstream competition model by allowing the active contribution of retailers to e…
Specific vs. ad valorem taxation and social welfare in mixed duopoly with foreign ownership
In this paper, we set up a mixed duopoly competition model between state-owned and private firms in order to compare specific and ad valorem taxes. Assuming that the total output under specific and ad valorem taxation remains unchanged, we find that if the public firm is completely privatised, the output of the private firm under the two tax schemes will be the same. If the public firm is not completely privatised, the output of the the private f…
Network externalities in a vertically differentiated luxury goods market
Positive Network Externalities and Negative Environmental Externalities in a Differentiated Duopoly With Entry Fee‐Refund Policy
Most of the studies on the implications of externalities rarely consider the coexistence of positive network externalities and negative externalities. This paper examines the effect of net externalities in price competition and the effectiveness of the entry fee‐refund policy. We show that the positive network externalities improve profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare, while negative externalities reduce them. The implementation of an en…
Pass‐Through and Tax Incidence in Differentiated Mixed Duopoly With Managerial Delegation
This article explores how managerial delegation affects pass‐through and tax incidence in a mixed Cournot duopoly. It finds that the delegation coefficient of the private firm's manager is positive, while the coefficient of public firm's manager is negative. Sales delegation tends to increase pass‐through rates and amplifies tax incidence. Comparing with the scenarios where a single firm hires a manager, both public and private firms hiring manag…
Privatization Neutrality Theorem in Free Entry Markets With Efficiency Gap
This paper explores the effects of privatization and subsidization policies in a mixed oligopoly, consisting of one semipublic firm and multiple private firms, where partial privatization affects technological disparity. The analysis shows that privatization can be either insufficient or excessive in reducing the efficiency gap, depending on market structure (restricted or free entry) and available policy tools. In cases of free entry with a comb…
Technology Licensing Versus Cannibalization, and Consumers' Welfare in Vertical Product Quality Market
This paper investigates the strategy choice of a high‐quality firm confronted with the entry of a low‐quality competitor in vertical product‐quality difference markets. We find that due to asymmetric market power, the high‐quality firm may prefer quality licensing over cannibalization as its optimal strategy. Fixed‐fee licensing contract has the potential to enhance consumer surplus and boost the profits of both firms, making it a potentially opt…
Economics (8 works) · Microeconomics (8 works) · Merger and Competition Analysis (7 works) · Business (6 works) · Digital Platforms and Economics (6 works) · Cournot competition (5 works) · Duopoly (5 works) · Industrial organization (5 works) · Market economy (4 works) · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing (3 works)