Share tenancy as strategic delegation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11889458 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tridip Ray (Cornell University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1999 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 45-60 |
| Publication date | 1999-02-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Development Economics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0304-3878 • E-ISSN: 1872-6089 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/s0304-3878(98)00102-3 |
| OpenAlex | W1990025292 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 16 |
The paper develops a new explanation of sharecropping based on the idea of an incentive equilibrium. It considers a set-up in which a few landlords in a village confront the choice of cultivating their farms by adopting different tenurial arrangements, ranging from owner operation, through the fixed-rental system to sharecropping. These landlords are the only sources of employment in the village, and compete in the wages they pay to their workers. In such an environment sharecropping is explained as a form of strategic delegation where a landlord gets extra benefit by having a share tenant and giving him suitable incentives
Agriculture · Business · Delegation · Economics · Incentive · Industrial organization · Labour economics · Landlord · Leasehold estate · Management · Microeconomics · Political science · Renting · Sharecropping · Economic theories and models · Land Rights and Reforms · Law · Political Economy and Marxism
Land, labor, and rural poverty
Theories of Sharecropping
Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping
Limited liability, wealth differences and tenancy contracts in agrarian economies
Limited liability and the existence of share tenancy
Efficient share tenancy contracts under risk
Private Property Rights and Sharecropping
On the Fixed Nature of Sharecropping Contracts
Delegation and the Theory of the Firm
Theories of Share Tenancy
Labor Supply Price, Market Wage, and the Social Opportunity Cost of Labor
| Citations per year | 0.08 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2001 - 2003 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |