Domenico Buccella
Biographic Data
| ID | 5970601 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Domenico Buccella |
| GIVEN NAMES | Domenico |
| FAMILY NAME | Buccella |
| SIGNATURE | BUCCELLA D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Kozminski University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9594-0630 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Centralised or decentralised unions? Welfare effects of wage-aggressiveness
Competitive wages and tax evasion in a Cournot duopoly
In a Cournot duopoly with indirect tax evasion, this paper counter-intuitively shows that, in the presence of positive competitive wages, a higher indirect taxation may increase expected profits. This result is likely to occur if the market size (or alternatively, if the cost pressure exerted by wages) is adequately large and the detection probability is not too high, and it is equivalent irrespective of firms optimally choosing either the tax ba…
Environmental delegation versus sales delegation
Recently, in their 2019 paper, Poyago-Theotoky and Yong consider a managerial Cournot duopoly with pollution externalities and emission taxes and propose an explicit environmental incentive in a managerial compensation contract. The authors compare several exogenous equilibria emerging in the symmetric sub-games in which the owner offers either the environmental delegation contract or the standard sales delegation contract: abatement and social w…
The disclosure decision game
This article presents a three-stage non-cooperative disclosure decision game (DDG), in which R&D-investing firms choose whether to disclose R&D-related information to the rival in a Cournot-like environment. Though firms have no (private) incentive to disclose information unilaterally on their cost-reducing R&D activity to prevent a rival from engaging in free appropriation, this work reveals opportunity for the government to design an optimal po…
Induced vs. Voluntary Green Production
This article studies the environmental and societal impacts of a polluting monopoly when a society strives for a clean environment. Two scenarios are considered: (1) the government levies an environmental tax to induce investment in emission-reducing technology, and (2) the monopolist engages in environmental corporate social responsibility (CSR). It is shown that taxation has a lower environmental impact, but the monopolist undertakes CSR activi…
‘Green’ managerial delegation theory
This article develops a non-cooperative game with managerial quantity-setting firms in which owners choose whether to delegate output and abatement decisions to managers through a contract based on emissions (conventionally denoted as ‘green’ delegation, GD) instead of sales (sales delegation, SD), and the government levies an emissions tax to incentivise firms’ emissions-reduction actions. First, it compares the Nash equilibrium outcomes between…
Managerial firms’ profitability, unions, and environmental taxes
This article examines how determining an optimal environmental tax in a Cournot duopoly with unionized labour markets and managerial firms departing from the strict profit‐maximization. It is shown that firm‐specific monopoly unions that set wages (1) reduce both the environmental tax and environmental damage and (2) counterintuitively, increase firms’ profitability when the abatement technology is not too “efficient”, and the public evaluation o…
Optimal Share of Privatisation in a Public Monopoly with Unionised Workers
In a monopoly industry with firm-union wage bargaining, we show that it is optimal to privatise a share of the public firm. The optimal privatisation share increases with the union's higher bargaining power and/or wage-orientation and, when the latter is large, full privatisation becomes socially optimal. Interestingly, the optimal privatisation share is the highest (lowest) when the government attributes a medium-low (low and high) weight to the…
Do labour union recognition and bargaining deter entry in a network industry? A sequential game model
Managerial firms’ profitability, unions, and environmental taxes
This article examines how determining an optimal environmental tax in a Cournot duopoly with unionized labour markets and managerial firms departing from the strict profit‐maximization. It is shown that firm‐specific monopoly unions that set wages (1) reduce both the environmental tax and environmental damage and (2) counterintuitively, increase firms’ profitability when the abatement technology is not too “efficient”, and the public evaluation o…
Do labour union recognition and bargaining deter entry in a network industry? A sequential game model
Optimal Share of Privatisation in a Public Monopoly with Unionised Workers
In a monopoly industry with firm-union wage bargaining, we show that it is optimal to privatise a share of the public firm. The optimal privatisation share increases with the union's higher bargaining power and/or wage-orientation and, when the latter is large, full privatisation becomes socially optimal. Interestingly, the optimal privatisation share is the highest (lowest) when the government attributes a medium-low (low and high) weight to the…
‘Green’ managerial delegation theory
This article develops a non-cooperative game with managerial quantity-setting firms in which owners choose whether to delegate output and abatement decisions to managers through a contract based on emissions (conventionally denoted as ‘green’ delegation, GD) instead of sales (sales delegation, SD), and the government levies an emissions tax to incentivise firms’ emissions-reduction actions. First, it compares the Nash equilibrium outcomes between…
Managerial firms’ profitability, unions, and environmental taxes
This article examines how determining an optimal environmental tax in a Cournot duopoly with unionized labour markets and managerial firms departing from the strict profit‐maximization. It is shown that firm‐specific monopoly unions that set wages (1) reduce both the environmental tax and environmental damage and (2) counterintuitively, increase firms’ profitability when the abatement technology is not too “efficient”, and the public evaluation o…
Environmental delegation versus sales delegation
Recently, in their 2019 paper, Poyago-Theotoky and Yong consider a managerial Cournot duopoly with pollution externalities and emission taxes and propose an explicit environmental incentive in a managerial compensation contract. The authors compare several exogenous equilibria emerging in the symmetric sub-games in which the owner offers either the environmental delegation contract or the standard sales delegation contract: abatement and social w…
The disclosure decision game
This article presents a three-stage non-cooperative disclosure decision game (DDG), in which R&D-investing firms choose whether to disclose R&D-related information to the rival in a Cournot-like environment. Though firms have no (private) incentive to disclose information unilaterally on their cost-reducing R&D activity to prevent a rival from engaging in free appropriation, this work reveals opportunity for the government to design an optimal po…
Induced vs. Voluntary Green Production
This article studies the environmental and societal impacts of a polluting monopoly when a society strives for a clean environment. Two scenarios are considered: (1) the government levies an environmental tax to induce investment in emission-reducing technology, and (2) the monopolist engages in environmental corporate social responsibility (CSR). It is shown that taxation has a lower environmental impact, but the monopolist undertakes CSR activi…
Competitive wages and tax evasion in a Cournot duopoly
In a Cournot duopoly with indirect tax evasion, this paper counter-intuitively shows that, in the presence of positive competitive wages, a higher indirect taxation may increase expected profits. This result is likely to occur if the market size (or alternatively, if the cost pressure exerted by wages) is adequately large and the detection probability is not too high, and it is equivalent irrespective of firms optimally choosing either the tax ba…
Centralised or decentralised unions? Welfare effects of wage-aggressiveness
Economics (8 works) · Microeconomics (8 works) · Merger and Competition Analysis (6 works) · Business (5 works) · Cournot competition (5 works) · Welfare (5 works) · Climate Change Policy and Economics (4 works) · Duopoly (4 works) · Industrial organization (4 works) · Nash equilibrium (4 works)