Jonathan Matheson
Biographic Data
| ID | 5965933 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jonathan Matheson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jonathan |
| FAMILY NAME | Matheson |
| SIGNATURE | MATHESON J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of North Florida |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3863-5119 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
The Philosophy of Epistemic Autonomy
This paper provides an introduction to the special issue on the philosophy of epistemic autonomy. In addition to giving some background on various conceptions of epistemic autonomy it provides brief summaries of the articles in the special issue
Epistemic Autonomy and Intellectual Humility
Recently, more attention has been paid to the nature and value of the intellectual virtue of epistemic autonomy. One underexplored issue concerns how epistemic autonomy is related to other intellectual virtues. Plausibly, epistemic autonomy is closely related to a number of intellectual virtues like curiosity, inquisitiveness, intellectual perseverance and intellectual courage to name just a few. Here, however, I will examine the relation between…
Measuring Virtuous Responses to Peer Disagreement
Some philosophers working on the epistemology of disagreement claim that conciliationist responses to peer disagreement embody a kind of intellectual humility. Others contend that standing firm or ‘sticking to one's guns’ in the face of peer disagreement may stem from an admirable kind of courage or internal fortitude. In this paper, we report the results of two empirical studies that examine the relationship between conciliationist and steadfast…
Why It's OK Not to Think for Yourself
We tend to applaud those who think for themselves: the ever-curious student, for example, or the grownup who does their own research. Even as we’re applauding, however, we ourselves often don’t think for ourselves. This book argues that’s completely OK. In fact, it’s often best just to take other folks’ word for it, allowing them to do the hard work of gathering and evaluating the relevant evidence. In making this argument, philosopher Jonathan M…
Applying Moral Caution in the Face of Disagreement
The Norm of Belief
John Gibbons’ The Norm of Belief concerns a puzzle. The puzzle concerns what you ought to believe. On the one hand, there is a strong intuitive pull to affirming that it is facts about the world that determine what you ought to believe—that there is an objective standard for evaluating beliefs. The truth norm (necessarily, for all p, you ought to believe p, only if p) is an example of such a norm. An objective standard for belief is intuitive, si…
No prominent works on this page.
The Norm of Belief
John Gibbons’ The Norm of Belief concerns a puzzle. The puzzle concerns what you ought to believe. On the one hand, there is a strong intuitive pull to affirming that it is facts about the world that determine what you ought to believe—that there is an objective standard for evaluating beliefs. The truth norm (necessarily, for all p, you ought to believe p, only if p) is an example of such a norm. An objective standard for belief is intuitive, si…
Applying Moral Caution in the Face of Disagreement
Measuring Virtuous Responses to Peer Disagreement
Some philosophers working on the epistemology of disagreement claim that conciliationist responses to peer disagreement embody a kind of intellectual humility. Others contend that standing firm or ‘sticking to one's guns’ in the face of peer disagreement may stem from an admirable kind of courage or internal fortitude. In this paper, we report the results of two empirical studies that examine the relationship between conciliationist and steadfast…
Why It's OK Not to Think for Yourself
We tend to applaud those who think for themselves: the ever-curious student, for example, or the grownup who does their own research. Even as we’re applauding, however, we ourselves often don’t think for ourselves. This book argues that’s completely OK. In fact, it’s often best just to take other folks’ word for it, allowing them to do the hard work of gathering and evaluating the relevant evidence. In making this argument, philosopher Jonathan M…
The Philosophy of Epistemic Autonomy
This paper provides an introduction to the special issue on the philosophy of epistemic autonomy. In addition to giving some background on various conceptions of epistemic autonomy it provides brief summaries of the articles in the special issue
Epistemic Autonomy and Intellectual Humility
Recently, more attention has been paid to the nature and value of the intellectual virtue of epistemic autonomy. One underexplored issue concerns how epistemic autonomy is related to other intellectual virtues. Plausibly, epistemic autonomy is closely related to a number of intellectual virtues like curiosity, inquisitiveness, intellectual perseverance and intellectual courage to name just a few. Here, however, I will examine the relation between…
Epistemology (5 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Ethics in medical practice (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Autonomy (2 works) · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies (2 works)