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Why It's OK Not to Think for Yourself

Bibliographic Data

ID19923404
AuthorsJonathan Matheson (0000-0003-3863-5119, corresponding author)
Year2023
Publication date2023-08-23
Open AccessNo
TypeBOOK
VenueWhy It's OK Not to Think for Yourself (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherRoutledge (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.4324/9781003369004
OpenAlexW4386091037
ISBN9781003369004
LanguageEN
Citations received6

We tend to applaud those who think for themselves: the ever-curious student, for example, or the grownup who does their own research. Even as we’re applauding, however, we ourselves often don’t think for ourselves. This book argues that’s completely OK. In fact, it’s often best just to take other folks’ word for it, allowing them to do the hard work of gathering and evaluating the relevant evidence. In making this argument, philosopher Jonathan Matheson shows how 'expert testimony' and 'the wisdom of crowds' are tested and provides convincing ideas that make it rational to believe something simply because other people believe it. Matheson then takes on philosophy’s best arguments against his thesis, including the idea that non-self-thinkers are free-riding on the work of others, Socrates’ claim that 'the unexamined life isn’t worth living,' and that outsourcing your intellectual labor makes you vulnerable to errors and manipulation. Matheson shows how these claims and others ultimately fail -- and that when it comes to thinking, we often need not be sheepish about being sheep. Key Features Discusses the idea of not thinking for yourself in the context of contemporary issues like climate change and vaccinations Engages in numerous contemporary debates in social epistemology Examines what can be valuable about thinking for yourself and argues that these are insufficient to require you to do so Outlines the key, practical takeaways from the argument in an epilogue

Climate Change and Geoengineering · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · History · Psychology · Science and Climate Studies

  • Green nudges, metacognition and rational agency. Do energy defaults undermine individual autonomy

    Adriano Angelucci, Alberto Pirni•Philosophical Psychology•2025

  • The Philosophy of Epistemic Autonomy

    Jonathan Matheson•Social Epistemology•2024

  • Epistemic Autonomy and Intellectual Humility

    Jonathan Matheson•Social Epistemology•2024

  • Epistemic Environmentalism and Autonomy

    Open Access•Eve Kitsik•Canadian Journal of Philosophy•2023

  • Political Debate Under Epistemic Asymmetries

    Janusz Grygieńć•Social Epistemology•2026

  • Democracy and the Academy

    Open Access•Hrishikesh Joshi•Philosophy & Public Affairs•2026

Citations per year2
Citation span2023 - 2026 (4)
Highly citedNo

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