Christopher Buford
Biographic Data
| ID | 5966048 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Christopher Buford |
| GIVEN NAMES | Christopher |
| FAMILY NAME | Buford |
| SIGNATURE | BUFORD C |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Akron |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Saving the debate
In 2019, David Hershenov argued for a set of three connected claims in this journal [1].First, any psychological account of what it is to be a human person (i.e. a view denying that human persons are identical to human animals), need not and in fact should not formulate a definition of death distinct from the merely biological definitions of death typically offered for human animals [2][3][4].Second, a distinct criterion for the deaths of human p…
Does Indeterminacy Matter
D erek P arfit has offered numerous arguments in an attempt to establish that identity is not what matters. J ens J ohannson has recently argued that P arfit's various arguments for the claim that identity is not what matters fail to establish what P arfit takes such arguments to establish. J ohannson contends that this is due in part to the invalidity of one of P arfit's key arguments, and the fact that P arfit ignores a position that is compati…
Philosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple Personality - Logi Gunnarsson
Logi Gunnarsson's book is an ambitious effort that addresses many of the philosophical issues often discussed by philosophers (and others) under the heading of ‘personal identity’. Gunnarsson argues for five theses, though I here mention what I take to be the two most controversial of the theses. First, co‐existence (CE): ‘each of us is a fundamental entity, of which there could exist (at the same time) two or more in one body’. For Gunnarsson, m…
The Psychological Approach to Personal Identity
We begin by discussing some logical constraints on the psychological approach to personal identity. We consider a problem for the psychological approach that arises in fission cases. The problem engenders the need for a non-branching clause in a psychological account of the co-personality relation. We look at some difficulties in formulating such a clause. We end by rejecting a recently proposed formulation of non-branching. Our criticism of the …
DeRose and the Comparative Account of Epistemic Closure
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DeRose and the Comparative Account of Epistemic Closure
The Psychological Approach to Personal Identity
We begin by discussing some logical constraints on the psychological approach to personal identity. We consider a problem for the psychological approach that arises in fission cases. The problem engenders the need for a non-branching clause in a psychological account of the co-personality relation. We look at some difficulties in formulating such a clause. We end by rejecting a recently proposed formulation of non-branching. Our criticism of the …
Philosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple Personality - Logi Gunnarsson
Logi Gunnarsson's book is an ambitious effort that addresses many of the philosophical issues often discussed by philosophers (and others) under the heading of ‘personal identity’. Gunnarsson argues for five theses, though I here mention what I take to be the two most controversial of the theses. First, co‐existence (CE): ‘each of us is a fundamental entity, of which there could exist (at the same time) two or more in one body’. For Gunnarsson, m…
Does Indeterminacy Matter
D erek P arfit has offered numerous arguments in an attempt to establish that identity is not what matters. J ens J ohannson has recently argued that P arfit's various arguments for the claim that identity is not what matters fail to establish what P arfit takes such arguments to establish. J ohannson contends that this is due in part to the invalidity of one of P arfit's key arguments, and the fact that P arfit ignores a position that is compati…
Saving the debate
In 2019, David Hershenov argued for a set of three connected claims in this journal [1].First, any psychological account of what it is to be a human person (i.e. a view denying that human persons are identical to human animals), need not and in fact should not formulate a definition of death distinct from the merely biological definitions of death typically offered for human animals [2][3][4].Second, a distinct criterion for the deaths of human p…
Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Aesthetics (3 works) · Identity (music) (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Personal identity (2 works) · Political science (2 works)